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The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed  
Regulatory Reform 
Randall D. Guynn 
The U.S. real estate bubble that popped in 2007 launched a sort 
of impersonal chevauchée1 that randomly destroyed trillions of dollars 
of value for nearly a year. It culminated in a worldwide financial 
panic during September and October of 2008.2 The most serious 
recession since the Great Depression followed.3 Central banks and 
governments throughout the world responded by flooding the 
markets with money and other liquidity, reducing interest rates, 
nationalizing or providing extraordinary assistance to major financial 
institutions, increasing government spending, and taking other 
creative steps to provide financial assistance to the markets.4 Only 
recently have markets begun to stabilize, but they remain fragile, like 
a man balancing on one leg.5 
The United States and other governments have responded to the 
financial crisis by proposing the broadest set of regulatory reforms 
 
  Partner and Head of the Financial Institutions Group, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 
New York, New York. © 2009, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. I am deeply indebted to Pengyu 
Jeff He, Reena Agrawal Sahni, and Cristina Diaz Fong for their excellent assistance in 
preparing this Article. This Article covers developments announced prior to October 9, 2009. 
This Article is the result of research done in preparation for a presentation at the Annual 
International Conference, Dubai Economic Forum, Oct. 27–28, 2009.  
 1. A chevauchée is a type of raid used by medieval armies to spread terror among 
civilian populations and turn them against their governments by randomly burning and 
plundering rich and thickly populated towns and countryside. See DESMOND SEWARD, THE 
HUNDRED YEARS WAR 38 (1978). 
 2. Kevin Warsh, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the 
Council of Institutional Investors 2009 Spring Meeting: The Panic of 2008 (Apr. 6, 2009), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/warsh20090406a .htm. 
 3. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the 2009 Commencement 
of the Boston College School of Law (May 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090522a.htm. 
 4.  Steven M. Davidoff & David T. Zaring, Big Deal: The Government’s Response to the 
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009); Gary Dorsch, After Shocks from the October 
Financial Markets Crash, MARKET ORACLE, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/ 
Article7166 .html. 
 5. I am indebted to Gary Crittenden, former Chief Financial Officer of Citigroup, for 
this metaphor. 
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since the 1930s.6 There is widespread belief that the financial crisis 
was caused by the free markets being too free. If we had better 
government regulation and supervision, and more of it, according to 
this way of thinking, we could have avoided the financial crisis and 
would prevent future crises from ever happening again.7 These 
beliefs may or may not be correct, but governments are moving 
ahead as if they were. Heaven help anyone who stands in their way!8 
This Article tries to identify who or what caused the financial 
crisis, how the crisis spread, how bad it is likely to become, and 
whether things are likely to become better or worse. It then discusses 
the U.S. and international government programs that were designed 
or implemented to arrest the crisis. Finally, it discusses the U.S. and 
international regulatory proposals designed to prevent future crises, 
or at least reduce their likelihood or severity. 
I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The global financial crisis has been characterized by an 
unexpected collapse of asset values; extreme uncertainty, fear, and 
pessimism about future asset values; a severe contraction of credit 
and risk-taking; rising unemployment; and a shrinkage in general 
economic output. Hundreds of banks have failed or been bailed out, 
and hundreds more will fail before the crisis is over. Trillions of 
dollars of asset values have been wiped out. Fortunes have been lost. 
Some families have lost their homes. Unemployment has soared. 
 
6. Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory 
Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform (“[M]y administration is proposing a 
sweeping overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale not seen since 
the reforms that followed the Great Depression.”). 
7. See, e.g., Helene Cooper & Charlie Savage, A Bit of ‘I Told You So’ Outside World 
Bank Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at A14 (“Year after year of unregulated free-market 
economics have finally come home to roost.”) (citations omitted); What’s Worse Than a Flawed 
Bailout?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at A26 (“[T]he free market in finance, unregulated and 
unsupervised, has failed.”). 
 8. At least one member of the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), 
which was established by Congress to investigate the causes of the financial crisis and report to 
Congress by December 15, 2010, has urged Congress to wait until the FCIC has finished 
identifying and analyzing the causes before it passes legislation to address the crisis. See Brian 
Burnsed, Financial Crisis: Time For More Study, or Action?, BUS. WK., Sept. 17, 2009, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/blogs/money_politics/archives/2009/09/ 
financial_crisi.html. The FCIC is modeled on the Pecora Commission, which performed a 
similar function in the United States in the 1930s. See LAWRENCE WHITE, THE CRISIS IN 
AMERICAN BANKING 97–100 (1995). 
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Ponzi schemes have been exposed. Economic output has slowed or 
even shrunk. 
The first signs of the financial crisis appeared in 2007, when U.S. 
real estate prices began to collapse and early delinquencies in recently 
underwritten subprime mortgages began to spike. Some investors 
started shorting real estate markets.9 The leveraged credit market 
dried up and billions of dollars of pending buy-out deals collapsed. 
Billions more in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) were written down. Several 
CEOs of major U.S. financial institutions lost their jobs.10 Others 
saved their jobs by obtaining capital infusions from sovereign wealth 
funds, hedge funds, private equity funds, and other pools of risk 
capital. 
The carnage quickly spread to Europe, where real estate prices 
also started to collapse, and many financial institutions had large 
exposures to both U.S. and European real estate investments.11 Real 
estate prices continued to collapse in early 2008, resulting in billions 
of dollars of additional CDO markdowns, the collapse and rescue of 
Northern Rock and Bear Stearns, and extraordinary measures by the 
Federal Reserve to de-stigmatize the discount window for 
commercial banks and make emergency liquidity facilities available to 
the large investment banks.12 As the Federal Reserve responded to 
the crisis by reducing interest rates and flooding the market with 
money, the value of the dollar plummeted relative to other 
currencies.13 By the summer of 2008, the price of oil, agricultural 
products, and other commodities—which are generally denominated 
 
9.  Vikas Bajaj & Edmund L. Andrews, Broader Losses from U.S. Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 24, 2007, at A1. 
10. Martha Graybow, American Chief Executives Face Tenuous Times, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
9, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/09/business/worldbusiness/ 
09iht-exec.1.9096108.html. 
11. The impact of the financial crisis on Asia has been more indirect—a drop in demand 
for Asian exports from the United States and Europe; losses by Asian sovereign wealth funds 
and governments on their investments in U.S. and European financial institutions; the sale by 
some U.S. and European financial institutions of their minority investments in the large 
Chinese banks; and a drop in the market capitalization of listed Asian companies. 
12. Landon Thomas, Jr. & Matthew Saltmarsh, European Regulators Move Swiftly to 
Rescue Two Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at C2. 
13. Jack Healy, As Dollars Pile Up, Uneasy Traders Lower Currency’s Value, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 22, 2009, at B1. 
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in U.S. dollars—soared almost in inverse proportion to any declines 
in the dollar.14 
The interbank credit markets seized up. The market value of 
U.S. and European financial institutions, especially U.S. mortgage 
giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,15 collapsed throughout the 
summer, putting increasing pressure on banking regulators 
throughout the world. The U.S. government was particularly 
concerned about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because of their size 
and importance to the U.S. housing market. On June 30, 2008, 
these two institutions had combined liabilities of over $5.5 trillion, 
on a combined total regulatory capital base of approximately $100 
billion.16 Moreover, there was a widespread perception that their 
obligations were backed by an implicit guarantee from the U.S. 
government. The U.S. Treasury asked Congress for a blank check—
the power to inject unlimited amounts of additional capital into 
Fannie and Freddie—arguing that if the market knew that Treasury 
had a “bazooka” instead of a “squirt gun,” it was substantially less 
likely that Treasury would be required to provide any financial 
assistance at all. Congress gave Treasury that authority on July 30, 
2008.17 
The market value of Fannie and Freddie, however, continued to 
collapse throughout August.18 The government determined that 
 
14. Adam Schreck, Soaring Crude Pushes Gas Closer to $4, WASH. POST, May 20, 2008, 
at D02. 
15. Fannie Mae is a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) formally known as 
the Federal National Mortgage Association. Freddie Mac is a U.S. GSE formally known as the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Their mission is to help provide liquidity to the 
U.S. residential market by purchasing or guaranteeing payment on certain residential 
mortgages. See FannieMae.com, About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/ 
kb/index?page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Feb. 13, 2010); FreddieMac.com, Our Mission, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/our_mission/ (last visited Feb. 13, 
2010). 
16. See Fannie Mae, Quarterly Report for the Quarter Ended June 30, 2008 (Form 10-
Q) (Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
310522/000095013308002717/w58421e10vq.htm; Freddie Mac, Quarterly Report for the 
Quarter Ended June 30, 2008 (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 6, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026214/000102621408000026/f58905e10vq.
htm.  
17. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 
2654 (2008). 
18. Stephen Bernard & Alan Zibel, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Shares Plummet, Real 
Clear Markets, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.realclearmarkets.com/news/ap/ 
finance_business/2008/Aug/21/fannie_mae__freddie_mac_shares_plummet.html (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2010).  
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many of their assets needed to be written down, and concluded that 
they would not be able to plug the hole by raising additional capital 
from the capital markets. Alarmed that fear of a failure of Fannie or 
Freddie could pull down the rest of the financial system, the U.S. 
Treasury decided to exercise its new “bazooka” authority on 
September 6, 2008—approximately five weeks after receiving it—
concluding that such action would calm the financial markets. The 
government put Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship and 
pledged to inject up to $200 billion of new capital in the form of 
senior preferred stock and warrants.19 The terms of the transaction 
resulted in an immediate dilution of 80% of common shareholder 
value, and a sharp drop in the value of junior preferred stock. The 
value of Fannie’s and Freddie’s senior and subordinated debt, 
however, soared because it was senior to the government’s 
investment. 
Rather than calming the markets, the “rescue” of Fannie and 
Freddie may have added fuel to the worldwide financial panic that 
continued throughout September and October. In any event, on the 
following weekend Lehman Brothers and AIG collapsed, and Merrill 
Lynch was bought at a fire-sale price by Bank of America.20 The 
Federal Reserve exercised its emergency powers under Section 13(3) 
of the Federal Reserve Act to rescue AIG, but the government 
allowed Lehman Brothers to fail.21 The terms of the AIG rescue were 
similar to Fannie and Freddie—the government received senior 
preferred stock and warrants, resulting in an immediate dilution of 
80% of common shareholder value, and a sharp drop in the value of 
junior preferred stock.22 But the value of AIG’s senior and 
subordinated debt soared, and the counterparties on its credit default 
swaps and other financial contracts were made whole. 
After the AIG collapse, the U.S. Treasury asked Congress for 
express authority to invest up to $700 billion in toxic mortgage and 
 
19. Dawn Kopecki, Lockhart’s Fannie, Freddie Guarantee Remarks Stir Up Confusion, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20670001&sid=ajIEoZCommlk. 
20. Charlie Gasparino, Bank of America to Buy Merrill Lynch for $50 Billion, CNBC, 
Sept. 14, 2008, http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708319/.  
21. See Craig Torres & Scott Lanman, Fed Eschews Markets, Picks Winners and Losers in 
AIG, Lehman, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 17, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ahHI4BgK8VI0&refer=home. 
22. Nanette Byrnes, AIG’s Uphill Battle, BUS. WK., Feb. 26, 2009, available at http:// 
www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/feb2009/db20090225_499189. htm. 
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other assets in order to clean up the balance sheets of the U.S. 
financial sector.23 While Treasury’s request for what was later called 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was pending before 
Congress, Washington Mutual (the largest thrift in the United 
States) failed and was sold to JP Morgan; Wachovia was rescued by 
Citigroup and then Wells Fargo; Fortis and Dexia were nationalized 
by the Dutch, Belgian and French governments; Ireland announced 
a program to recapitalize its banking system; and the Icelandic 
banking system collapsed and a large portion of its assets were seized 
by the U.K. government.24 Commodity prices, which had spiked 
during the summer as the dollar fell, reversed course and began to 
fall as the market began to fear a worldwide depression more than a 
weakened U.S. dollar.25 
The House rejected TARP on September 30, 2008, resulting in 
the largest one-day drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average of 778 
points, or $1.3 trillion in market value. The Senate quickly passed a 
bill during the first week of October, the House reconsidered its 
action, and President Bush signed the bill into law on the same day 
the House approved it.26 
During the second week in October, the United Kingdom 
announced the terms of its rescue program for the Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group and Lloyds-HBOS, two of the largest banks in the 
world, which were on the brink of collapse.27 The U.S. Treasury also 
announced its Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which involved 
making investments of up to $250 billion in the preferred stock of 
U.S. insured depository institutions and their holding companies.28 
The U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
temporarily increased deposit insurance coverage to $250,000 per 
 
23. Mark Thompson, 7 Questions About the $700 Billion Bailout, TIME.COM, Sept. 24, 
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1843941,00.html. 
24. Chris Dolmetsch, Subprime Collapse to Global Financial Meltdown: Timeline, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 13, 2008 available at http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=20601208&sid=aleqkSjAAw10. 
25. John Wilen, Dollar’s Fall Stokes Spike in Oil, Gas Prices, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 13, 
2008, at C3. 
26. Jay Newton, What the Bailout-Bill Crisis Has Wrought, TIME.COM, Oct. 3, 2008, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1847205,00.html. 
27. Ross Kerber, Citizens Bank Parent to Be Part of British Rescue, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Oct. 9, 2008, at E1. 
28. Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Fighting the Financial Crisis, One Challenge at a Time, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at A27. 
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person per institution, as well as announcing the creation of the 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, which would provide 
credit support to debt capital market issuances and non-interest 
bearing transaction accounts.29 
Week three in October resulted in a $54 billion rescue of UBS 
by the Swiss National Bank, and the creation of a €500 billion rescue 
program by Germany to support its banking sector.30 The next 
several weeks saw a stampede of U.S. financial institutions seeking to 
acquire insured depository institutions in the United States in order 
to qualify for CPP money. The U.S. government announced an 
additional $20 billion in capital support and a related $301 billion 
asset guarantee program for Citigroup in late November.31 The U.S. 
government announced a similar program of extraordinary support 
for Bank of America in early 2009 to facilitate its acquisition of 
Merrill Lynch, which continued to hemorrhage value between 
signing and closing.32 Similar failures, rescues, and financial assistance 
programs were announced throughout 2009 after the genuine panic 
receded. For a timeline of these financial crisis events, see Annex A, 
which is borrowed from The Davis Polk Financial Crisis Manual.33 
It will be many years before the definitive account is written on 
the central cause or causes of the financial crisis. But several people 
have offered theories. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has 
identified global imbalances in savings rates and cash flows as the 
root cause.34 Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan has stressed the 
 
29. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Temporary Guarantee Program Frequently 
Asked Questions (Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.fdic.gov/ regulations/resources/TLGP/ 
faq.html. 
30. Nelson D. Schwartz, UBS Gets Bailout, and Credit Suisse Will Seek New Capital, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 10/16/business/ 
worldbusiness/16iht-sbanks.4.17023713.html.  
31. Sarah Jones, Europe Stocks Rise on Citigroup Rescue; Deutsche Bank, BHP Gain, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 24, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXSCLxGmWpuk. 
32. Daniel Kruger, Fed Says Merrill Lynch Is No Longer Primary Dealer (Update 1), 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 11, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601087&sid=aVWzNaO9CD9M&refer=home. 
33. THE DAVIS POLK FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE LAWS, 
REGULATIONS AND CONTRACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009) [hereinafter DPFCM], 
available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/d1ab7627-e45d-4d35-b6f1-
ef356ba686f2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2a31cab4-3682-420e-926f-054c72e 
3149d/fcm.pdf. 
 34. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at Morehouse College: 
Four Questions About the Financial Crisis (Apr. 14, 2009), available at 
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same global imbalances, which he characterized as “excessive” saving 
in China and oil producing countries, and huge investments of such 
savings in U.S. assets, as well as the surprising failure of the free 
market system to self-correct.35 Paul Volcker, the Fed Chairman 
before Alan Greenspan, emphasized the repeal of Glass-Steagall as 
one of the principal causes.36 Lord Turner identified macroeconomic 
trends, excessive consumer and business leverage, misplaced reliance 
on mathematical models, and pro-cyclical policies as among the chief 
causes of the financial crisis.37 French finance minister Christine 
Lagarde points to the decision by U.S. authorities to allow Lehman 
Brothers to fail as a key reason why the financial crisis became so 
severe.38 The de Larosière Group emphasized the U.S. factors that 
contributed to causing the financial crisis, including low-interest rate 
policies and the creation of complex securitization products that 
financial institutions did not understand.39 Others see rating agencies 
and mark-to-model accounting for assets with no ready market as 
creating a pernicious feedback loop that caused excessive mark-
downs of illiquid assets. Still others blame weak risk management 
and a failure to make tough decisions during boom years. 
Some have blamed mortgage brokers for deceiving consumers 
into taking risks they could not afford by offering them complex 
mortgage loans with teaser rates and flexible payment options that 
 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090414a.htm. 
 35. See, e.g., ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW 
WORLD (2007); Alan Greenspan, The Fed Didn’t Cause the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
11, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123672965066989281.html; 
Testimony of Alan Greenspan Before the Committee of Government Oversight and Reform 
(Oct. 23, 2008), available at http://oversight.house.govdocuments/20081023100438.pdf. 
 36. See Statement of Paul Volcker Before the House Financial Services Committee 
(Sept. 24, 2009), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/ 
financialsvcs_dem/volcker.pdf; Matthew Benjamin and Christine Hopper, Volcker Urges 
Dividing Investment, Commercial Banks (Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Mar. 6, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=atSsZ5Fp8xuY&refer=home. 
 37. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY 
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL BANKING CRISIS (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. 
 38. Tamora Vidaillet & Veronique Tison, Letting Lehman Go Was Big Mistake: French 
Finmin, REUTERS, Oct. 8, 2008, (Patrick Graham ed.) http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSTRE49735Z20081008. 
 39. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION IN THE EU (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_ en.pdf. 
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the consumers could not understand.40 Others say that subprime and 
other borrowers, seeing the opportunity to use the real estate bubble 
to their advantage, rolled the dice and are now simply disappointed 
that their gamble did not pay off.41 Still others blame government 
policies that encouraged investors to take excessive risk by giving 
them reason to believe that some financial institutions—like 
mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—were “too big or 
complex to fail.”42 Still others blame executive compensation policies 
that do not require senior managers to internalize the costs of 
excessive risk-taking.43 Still others blame a combination of 
government policies and inherent market failures.44 
Many regulators and other policymakers, such as U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Tim Geithner, stress the lack of adequate regulatory or 
supervisory powers—especially the failure of any single regulator to 
have adequate power to gather information about or regulate the 
“financial system” as a whole—the existence of regulatory arbitrage, 
the lack of resolution authority over systemically important financial 
institutions, and the lack of power to regulate over-the-counter 
 
 40. See, e.g., Letter from Barney Frank, Congressman, 4th Cong. Dist. of Mass., U.S. 
Cong. to Constituents About the Causes of the Economic Crisis (Oct. 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.house.gov/frank/docs/2008/08-11-08-economic-crisis-letter.html; Barney 
Frank, Congressman, 4th Cong. Dist. of Mass., U.S. Cong., Speech to U.S. House of 
Representatives: The Great Economic Hole (Apr. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.house.gov/frank/speeches/ 2009/04-02-09-great-economic-hole.html. 
 41. See, e.g., David Reilly, Mortgage Bombs, Quiet for Now, Await Next Boom, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 24, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=20601039&sid=asCPzYMnjbE4; Kathleen Pender, Why We Shouldn’t Be 
Bailing out Subprime Lenders or Borrowers, SFGATE.COM, Apr. 22, 2007, available at http:// 
articles.sfgate.com/2007-04-22/business/17241101_1_subprime-mess-bail-conventional-
mortgage; Eli Leher & George Benston, Subprime Borrowers: Not Innocents, BLOOMBERG 
BUS. WK., 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/debateroom/archives/ 
2008/01/subprime_borrow.html. 
 42. See, e.g., Peter Wallison, Congress Is the Real Systemic Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123725470200650641.html; Peter J. 
Wallison, Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Fin. Pol’y Studies, Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y & Res., 
Testimony Before the House Financial Services Committee (Mar. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/wallison031709.pdf. 
 43. See, e.g., Gene Sperling, Couns. to the Sec’y of the Treasury, U.S. Dept. of the 
Treasury, Testimony Before the House Financial Services Committee (June 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/sperling.pdf; 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Dir. of the Corp. Governance Program, Harvard Law School, Written 
Testimony Before the House Financial Services Committee (Jan. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/bebchuk.pdf. 
 44. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND 
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009). 
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derivatives.45 Others say the regulators had all the power they 
needed, but failed to exercise it because they did not see the financial 
crisis coming. Others blame pro-cyclical capital, reserving or mark-
to-market accounting policies, or the lack of adequate capital, 
liquidity and leverage requirements. 
Although the final word on who or what caused the financial 
crisis has not been written, this financial crisis has followed a similar 
pattern that almost every other mania, panic, and crash has followed 
before this one. Some combination of cheap credit and excessive 
optimism creates a bubble in asset prices, typically in real estate or 
commodities. Eventually this bubble pops, resulting in a collapse in 
asset prices, a spike in interest rates, extreme uncertainty about 
“true” asset values, and excessive pessimism. This pattern has been 
described in great detail in Charles Kindleberger’s classic work, 
Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises.46 
It is a movie we have seen over and over again, at least since the 
1600s, including the rise and collapse of tulip prices in 1637 and the 
European banking crisis that followed; the collapse of the South Sea 
bubble of 1720, which resulted in a U.K. banking crisis and claimed 
many personal fortunes, including that of Sir Isaac Newton; the 
Banking Panic of 1837, which wiped out a large number of banks 
throughout the United States; the Banking Panic of 1907, where J. 
Pierpont Morgan single-handedly restored confidence in the U.S. 
markets; the Roaring Twenties, 1929 Crash and the Great 
Depression of the 1930s; the U.S. savings and loan crisis of the late 
1980s and early 1990s; and the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. 
In all of these cases, the prototypical pattern repeated itself, although 
with differences in each one.47 
The recent global financial crisis was triggered by a collapse in 
U.S. real estate prices at a time when U.S. households, corporations, 
and financial institutions had built up huge levels of debt leverage. 
The first signs of the collapse appeared in the early delinquency rates 
of subprime mortgages underwritten in 2005, 2006, and 2007. This 
 
45. See U.S. TREASURY, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 
AND REGULATION (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/ 
docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
46. Charles KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
CRISES (2005); see also CARMEN REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: 
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL Folly (2009). 
47. See KINDLEBERGER, supra note 46, at 8–20. 
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led to increasing stress in the markets, a spike in interbank interest 
rates, the panic that occurred in September and October of 2008, 
and the recession in economic output that followed.48 
Global macroeconomic factors certainly contributed to the shape 
and fury of this financial crisis. Excess savings in rapidly developing 
countries, such as China and oil-exporting countries, were invested 
in the debt of industrialized nations, driving down interest rates 
there. Cheap exports from developing countries (especially China 
and India) kept inflation low.49 Increased productivity from the 
computer and information technology revolution also kept inflation 
low.50 U.S. housing and monetary policy, Fannie and Freddie, and 
securitization also kept mortgage interest rates low. These conditions 
produced excessive optimism, talk of a “new paradigm” for 
economic growth and productivity, and cheap credit.51 This in turn 
produced a real estate bubble in the United States and Europe, and a 
spike in consumer debt and financial institution leverage. Increased 
demand from developing countries also contributed to bubbles in 
commodities prices. 
The global financial crisis spread through the financial sector first 
as these crises always do.52 Banks and other financial institutions are 
characterized by high leverage, illiquid long-term assets, and 
extremely short-term liabilities (e.g., demand deposits). These 
characteristics make banks and other financial institutions susceptible 
to “runs on the bank.”53 A run on a bank (or other financial 
institution) will result in a sudden and unexpected death spiral that is 
difficult to predict or arrest. Financial institutions are different from 
widget companies, which typically slide slowly into bankruptcy. 
History shows that financial institutions almost always fail suddenly 
and unexpectedly. This time it was no different. And Main Street 
immediately aligned against Wall Street. 
The rational response of a financial institution to the threat of a 
run on the bank makes things worse. The rational response is to 
 
48. See POSNER, supra note 44, at 253. 
49. Id. at 37–39. 
50. See STEPHAN KUDYBA AND ROMESH DIWAN, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 
CORPORATE PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE NEW ECONOMY 8–10 (2002). 
51. Id. at 4–8. 
52. ELLEN D. RUSSELL, NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS AND KEYNESIAN WELFARE 
STATE CAPITALISM 34 (2006). 
53. Id. 
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circle the wagons, increase capital and cash reserves, reduce the 
amount of credit extended, and otherwise reduce the institution’s 
leverage. Because of a sort of inverse money multiplier effect, this 
type of response produces a severe contraction of credit throughout 
the system. This hurts everyone, the financial institution itself, other 
financial institutions, widget companies, and consumers. It is a 
negative externality like air pollution. 
To illustrate how the money multiplier magnifies the expansion 
and contraction of credit throughout the system, consider the 
following example. Assuming a 10 fractional reserve requirement, 
every $100 of whatever monetary base (e.g., central bank money) is 
deposited into the banking system will multiply by 10 times into 
$1,000 of credit throughout the system ($100 * 1/0.10) when 
there is strong public confidence in the system. This can be called 
the triumph of the money multiplier in strong economies. The 
tragedy of the money multiplier during a financial crisis can be 
illustrated by the following modification of the example above. If 
banks are required or choose to circle the wagons during a financial 
crisis, so that fractional reserves grow from 10% to 20%, the money 
multiplier will amplify the contraction of credit. The amount of 
credit available in the system will shrink by 50% or more (i.e., $500), 
not by only 10% or $100. Available statistics show that the money 
multiplier fell from about 10 times in 2007 to less than 5 times by 
2009,54 resulting in a 50% or greater contraction in available money 
and credit. 
Several factors made this financial crisis worse than it might 
otherwise have been. For example, the very instruments that helped 
manage credit risk, reduce the cost of credit and increase the 
availability of credit during normal times before the financial crisis 
made the crisis more violent. I am talking about mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), CDO-
squared, collateralized securities lending programs, and credit default 
swaps.55 Excessive confidence about financial models, as well as the 
failure of credit rating agencies to update their credit rating models 
as circumstances changed, also contributed to the existence and 
 
54. See The Disappearing Money Multiplier,  http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/ 
2009/01/disappearing-money-multiplier.html (Jan. 5, 2009). 
55. See Floyd Norris, Credit Crisis? Just Wait for a Replay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2007, 
at C1. 
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depth of the crisis.56 Mark-to-model accounting rules, applied to 
assets with no ready market value, as well as the SEC’s resistance to 
counter-cyclical loan loss reserves by banking institutions (in the 
name of preventing income management through the use of “cookie 
jars”) may also have deepened the financial crisis.57 
The recent global financial crisis is the worst crisis since the Great 
Depression.58 It is far worse than the U.S. savings and loan crisis of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.59 But unemployment is not even 
close to the figures experienced during the Great Depression (yet), 
nor has sustained deflation or contraction in economic output 
occurred.60 And the U.S. and world economies appear to be 
stabilizing.61 
But there are serious dangers ahead. If the United States or other 
governments do not pull back the extraordinary assistance to the 
markets soon enough, we could experience runaway inflation that 
will be difficult to control. On the other hand, if the United States 
and other governments pull back too quickly, we could see another 
collapse in asset prices and a double-dip recession. Fed Chairman 
Ben Bernanke recently stated that “the recession is very likely over at 
this point, [but] it’s still going to feel like a very weak economy for 
some time, as many people will still find that their job security . . . is 
not what they wish it was.”62 Most economists seem to share 
Chairman Bernanke’s cautious optimism.63 In contrast, Professor 
Nouriel Roubini has stated that “Data from the US—rising 
 
56. Gretchen Morgenson, House Panel Scrutinizes Rating Firms, N.Y. TIMES, October 
22, 2008, at B1. 
57. Ann Lee, Expect More Crisis, FORBES.COM, July 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/16/banks-crisis-illiquid-oped-cx_al_0716lee.html. 
58. John Harwood, For Top Economic Aides, a Shaky Week in Office, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
24, 2010, at A11. 
59. Michael Hudson and Jim Overton, The Second Savings and Loan Scandal, FORBES, 
Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/21/wamu-indymac-thrifts-
oped-cx_mh_jo_0121hudsonoverton.html. 
60. Carolyn Lochhead, It’s Not the Depression, Top Obama Adviser Says, S.F. CHRON., 
Mar. 10, 2009, at A1. 
61. Craig Torres, Bernanke Sees ‘Tentative Signs’ Economy Stabilizing, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, July 21, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=20601087&sid=aLZRcOJqCKME. 
62. Sara Murray and Ann Zimmerman, Bernanke: Recession ‘Likely Over’, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 16, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125301730771311713.html. 
63. Phil Izzo, Economists Call for Bernanke to Stay, Say Recession Is Over, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 11, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124993702311020493.html. 
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unemployment, falling household consumption, still declining 
industrial production and a weak housing market—suggests that the 
U.S. recession is not over yet.”64 He later predicted that “the 
economy is poised to slip back to anemic growth . . . in 2010, posing 
the risk of a double-dip recession.”65 
Particularly troubling signs in the United States include the 
continued rise in unemployment, the percentages of mortgage loans 
that are either delinquent or in foreclosure, and growing 
delinquencies in the prime mortgage market. Most troubling of all, 
the FDIC has already closed nearly 100 banks in 2009 and has more 
than 400 additional banks (with $300 billion in assets) on its 
“problem list” at a time when its deposit insurance fund is nearly 
exhausted.66 While all 400 problem banks need not fail, a large 
percentage of them are likely to fail in the near future. 
II. PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO FIGHT THE CRISIS 
I will give only a brief overview of the U.S. and international 
government programs that were designed or implemented to arrest 
the global financial crisis. Anyone who is interested in a more 
complete analysis of the programs proposed or implemented in the 
United States should consult The Davis Polk Financial Crisis 
Manual, which contains a thorough analysis of the laws, regulations, 
and contracts used in the United States to address the financial crisis. 
Portions of the manual are excerpted below. 
A. U.S. Programs 
The U.S. programs designed to battle the financial crisis consist 
primarily of the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
 
64. Nouriel Roubini, A Phantom Recovery? BUSINESS STANDARD, Aug. 19, 2009, 
available at http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/nouriel-roubiniphantom-
recovery/367421/.  
65. Nouriel Roubini, Stop Asking When the Recession Will End, FORBES, Aug. 20, 2009, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/19/recession-job-losses-nber-gdp-growth-
opinions-columnists-nouriel-roubini.html. 
66. In order to replenish the deposit insurance fund, the FDIC has proposed that 
insured depository institutions prepay their quarterly risk-based assessments for the next three 
years by the end of 2009. Currently, the FDIC projects that its liquidity needs would exceed 
its liquid assets on hand beginning in the first quarter of 2010 (absent any action). The FDIC 
estimates that total prepaid assessments would amount to $45 billion. See Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, 12 C.F.R. § 327 (2009), available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
regulations/laws/federal/2009/09proposeAD49.pdf.  
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implemented under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 (EESA), as amended by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA); the various programs 
implemented by the Federal Reserve under its traditional discount 
window authority for commercial banks and Section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act; the FDIC’s use of its Deposit Insurance Fund 
to provide critical assistance to the banking system, including 
resolving failed banks and thrifts, temporarily increasing deposit 
insurance coverage to $250,000 per person per institution, and its 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP); and the 
Treasury’s rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pursuant to the 
authority granted by the Housing Economic Recovery Act of 2008 
(HERA). 
1. Federal Reserve programs 
Despite the greater “press and political attention”67 paid to 
TARP and the TLGP, the programs implemented by the Federal 
Reserve under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act represent 
the largest portion of U.S. government intervention.68 Section 13(3) 
was used by the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity to Wall Street 
and U.S. companies, rescue Bear Stearns and AIG, and conduct 
monetary policy. Indeed, it was the government’s tool of choice 
until the Bush Administration asked for new congressional 
authority—first to inject capital directly into Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, and then to purchase troubled assets from and inject capital 
directly into the U.S. financial system as a whole. As a result of such 
programs, “the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet more than doubled 
from August 2007 to December 2008, and [its] total assets at 
December 31, 2008, at the height of the crisis, were more than $2 
trillion, more than twice the highest year-end total in its history.”69 
Section 13(3) permits the Federal Reserve to make “secured 
extensions of credit to any ‘individual, partnership, or corporation.’ 
It is not limited to depository institutions. But it can be invoked only 
under ‘unusual and exigent circumstances’ upon the affirmative vote 
 
67. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 19.  
68. Id. 
69. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 26 (citing Niel Willardson, Actions to Restore Financial 
Stability: A Summary of Recent Federal Initiatives, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS: 
THE REGION (Dec. 2008), at 16, available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/ 
pubs/region/08-12/willardson.pdf.) 
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of at least five members of the Federal Reserve.70 Until 2008, it had 
not been used since the Great Depression.”71 
 a. Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF).  
 The Federal Reserve’s first use of its Section 13(3) authority 
during the global financial crisis was to establish the TSLF on 
March 11, 2008. . . In the weeks leading up to the program, the 
credit markets had become frozen for certain highly leveraged 
market participants.72 The TSLF was designed as a term lending 
facility for primary dealers.”73 It was created to provide liquidity to 
primary dealers, and specifically to add liquidity to the mortgage-
backed securities [MBS] market.74 The Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York was authorized to lend up to $200 billion of U.S. 
Treasury securities to primary dealers secured for a term of 28 days 
by pledge of eligible collateral. In effect, the program allowed 
primary dealers to swap lower quality securities for higher quality 
 
70. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 20 (citing the Federal Reserve Act by the Act of July 21, 
1932, 47 Stat. 715). 
71. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 20–21 (“Five days after its enactment, on July 26, 1932, 
the Federal Reserve issued a circular permission to the Federal Reserve banks to make loans 
under the new authority for a period of six months, beginning August 1, 1932, and renewed 
such authorization from time to time until July 31, 1936. See Howard Hackley, LENDING 
FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS: A HISTORY 129–30 (1973). Before March 11, 
2008, all secured loans under Section 13(3) had been made during the 1932–36 period, with 
most occurring in 1932 and 1933. Section 13(3) fell into disuse even during the Great 
Depression principally because of: (i) the addition of Section 13(b) to the Federal Reserve Act 
by the Industrial Advances Act of 1934, which authorized the Federal Reserve to make loans 
to commercial and industrial companies without the emergency condition, and (ii) the ability 
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which was formed by the Hoover Administration 
in 1932 pursuant to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 5, to make 
loans to nonbanking companies on more attractive terms than those offered by the Federal 
Reserve. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was liquidated in 1957 pursuant to the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Liquidation Act of 1953 and Section 13(b) was repealed 
by the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. See David Fettig, Lender of More than Last 
Resort: Recalling Section 13(b) and the Years When the Federal Reserve Opened its Discount 
Window to Businesses, THE REGION (Dec. 2002), at 18–19, 44–45, available at 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/02-12/lender.pdf; Walker Todd, History of 
and Rationales for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, FED RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND 
ECON REV., 1992 Q.4, at 24, available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/ 
review/1992/92-q4-todd.pdf; Howard Hackley, LENDING FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANKS: A HISTORY 127–136, 144–145 (1973)”). Id. at 21 n.17. 
72. Id. at 22. 
73. Id. (“Primary dealers are the 18 large financial institutions that are the 
counterparties with which the Federal Reserve undertakes open market operations. Many of 
the 18 were also Wall Street’s most prominent investment banks.”). Id at n.24.  
74. Id. at 22. 
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[U.S. Treasury] securities that could be used more easily to obtain 
credit in the interbank or capital markets.75 
 b. Bear Stearns.  
 Despite the implementation of the TSLF, Bear Stearns suffered 
a classic “run on the bank.” Its cash reserves fell from over $20 
billion to $2 billion in approximately one week. By Friday, March 
14, Bear Stearns was prepared to file for bankruptcy in the absence 
of a significant capital infusion. Since no significant capital infusion 
was forthcoming from the private sector, the Federal Reserve was 
left as the only player that could quickly rescue Bear Stearns from 
bankruptcy.76 
 On March 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve, by the unanimous 
vote of all available members, authorized an extension of credit to 
Bear Stearns through JPMorgan Chase Bank under Section 
13(3).77 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York made an overnight 
loan of $12.9 billion to JPMorgan Chase Bank through its normal 
discount window facilities. The loan was nonrecourse and was fully 
secured by $13.8 billion of Bear Stearns assets. The loan was a 
simultaneous back-to-back transaction, whereby JPMorgan Chase 
Bank provided secured financing to Bear Stearns and took as 
collateral the same assets that JPMorgan Chase Bank used to secure 
its loan from the Federal Reserve.78 
 
75. Id. at 22–23 (“For ‘Schedule 1’ auctions, the eligible collateral included Treasury 
securities, agency securities, and agency mortgage-backed securities issued or fully guaranteed 
by the federal agencies. For ‘Schedule 2’ auctions, the eligible collateral includes Schedule 1 
collateral plus highly rated private securities. Highly rated private securities refers to investment 
grade corporate securities, investment grade municipal securities, investment grade mortgage-
backed securities, and investment grade asset-backed securities. ‘Schedule 1’ auctions have 
since been discontinued, while ‘Schedule 2’ auctions continue to take place. See FEDERAL 
RESERVE, PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY 
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES 
AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 2–4 
(Aug. 25, 2009).”). Id. at 23 n.25. 
76. Id. at 24 (citing David Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 157–59 (2009)). 
77. Id. (“Section 13(3) generally requires an affirmative vote of at least five members of 
the Federal Reserve Board to approve an extension of credit under that provision. On March 
14, 2008, one member of the Federal Reserve Board was unavailable at the time of the vote 
because he was en route from Finland and two other board seats were vacant. See David 
Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 162 (2009). As permitted under Section 11(r)(2) of the Federal 
Reserve Act, however, the Board’s action approving the extension of credit was adopted by 
unanimous vote of all available members. See David Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 162 (2009)”). 
Id. at n.32.  
78. Id. at 24–25. 
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 After the Federal Reserve’s emergency loan, the focus turned to 
finding an acquirer for Bear Stearns—before the opening of 
business in Asia on Monday morning, March 17, which was Sunday 
evening, March 16 in the United States.79 JPMorgan initially 
offered to acquire Bear Stearns for $2 per share, or approximately 
$236 million in total, but later raised its price to $10 per share, or 
approximately $1.1 billion in total, in order to obtain [approval for 
the transaction from Bear Stearns shareholders].80 Since JPMorgan 
did not want to acquire certain illiquid Bear Stearns assets, the 
Federal Reserve was needed to absorb the risks associated with such 
assets. The Federal Reserve only had the authority to lend and did 
not have the authority to purchase assets, so any structure had to 
be based on the Federal Reserve making a loan.81 
 The Federal Reserve authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to make a secured loan of up to $30 billion to a special 
purpose vehicle, Maiden Lane, in order to purchase “less liquid” 82 
assets of Bear Stearns and facilitate the acquisition of Bear Stearns 
by JPMorgan. The loan was authorized pursuant to Section 13(3). 
JPMorgan would be required to lend Maiden Lane $1 billion. The 
Federal Reserve’s loan was secured by the assets held by Maiden 
Lane.83 
 
79. Id. at 25. (“During the worst weeks of the financial crisis in the fall of 2008, 
weekend rescues generally operated under a Sunday evening deadline, reflecting the 
importance of Asian markets. According to one commentator, Goldman Sachs’ economists 
sent one of their weekly e-mails with the subject line “Sunday is the New Monday.” See David 
Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 1–2 (2009).”). Id. at 25, n.36. 
80. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 25–26. (“Some commentators have noted that 
JPMorgan’s bargaining position was weakened by the fact that it had agreed to guarantee all of 
Bear Stearns’ obligations for one year from the signing of the acquisition agreement, and the 
guarantee did not include a provision that would allow the guarantee to terminate if the Bear 
Stearns shareholders failed to approve the transaction. See Steven M. Davidoff, Bear’s Big 
Guarantee, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2008/03/24/bears-big-guarantee/; Ashby Jones, Did Deal Overexpose JP Morgan?, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 25, 2008, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1206409 
36857461199.html?mod=hps_us_whats_news.”). Id. at 26 n.38. 
81. Id. at 26. 
82. Id. (citing Federal Reserve, Periodic Report Pursuant to Section 129(b) of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Update on Outstanding Lending Facilities 
Authorized by the Board under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 9 (Aug. 25, 2009)). 
83. Id. (citing Federal Reserve, Periodic Report Pursuant to Section 129(b) of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Update on Outstanding Lending Facilities 
Authorized by the Board under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 9–10 (Aug. 25, 
2009)). 
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 c. Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).  
 Although Bear Stearns had been rescued, there was a fear that 
other investment banks with similar funding models could also face 
liquidity squeezes and ultimately the risk of failure. In order to 
provide these institutions with more liquidity and prevent this 
outcome, the Federal Reserve announced the creation of the PDCF 
on March 16, 2008, under Section 13(3).84 The PDCF is a 
temporary overnight liquidity facility that provides secured loans to 
primary dealers. The PDCF allows primary dealers to borrow funds 
from the Federal Reserve secured by a broader range of collateral 
than is permissible to secure borrowings under the discount 
window. Since the primary dealers included the largest investment 
banks in the United States, the PDCF provided the largest U.S. 
broker-dealers with temporary access to a Federal Reserve facility 
that is very similar to the Federal Reserve discount window.85 
 d. AIG. “In the third quarter of 2008, AIG started to experience 
an increasingly serious liquidity crunch,”86 largely because of its 
securities lending business and the credit default swap portfolio of its 
affiliate, AIG Financial Products (AIGFP). “Under AIG’s securities 
lending program, AIG lent securities on behalf of its insurance 
company subsidiaries against cash collateral that was received from 
borrowers and invested in securities,”87 including residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). AIG was responsible for any 
deficit in the cash collateral pool caused by any losses sustained in 
investing it or if AIG’s credit rating were downgraded. Under 
AIGFP’s credit default swap contracts, AIGFP was required to post 
collateral if the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) protected by 
its credit default swaps fell in value or AIG’s credit rating were 
downgraded. 
Because of drops in the value of RMBS and CDOs in August, 
AIG was required to post $3.3 billion of additional collateral into its 
securities lending program88 and AIGFP was required to post $5.9 
billion of additional collateral to secure its credit default swap 
 
84. See Press Release, Federal Reserve (Mar. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080316a.htm. 
85. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 26.  
86. Id. at 28. 
87. Id.  
88. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
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obligations.89 After downgrades in AIG’s credit ratings in early 
September, AIGFP estimated that it would need an additional 
amount in excess of $20 billion in order to fund additional collateral 
requirements under its credit default swap obligations.90 Inability to 
refinance its commercial paper commitments, sharp declines in AIG’s 
common stock, and regulatory constraints on AIG’s ability to 
borrow from its insurance company subsidiaries left AIG in severe 
difficulty during the weekend of September 13–14. AIG explored 
the possibility of a secured lending facility from the private sector, 
but was unable to obtain the necessary liquidity or capital from that 
avenue.91 
“On September 16, 2008, pursuant to Section 13(3), the 
Federal Reserve authorized the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
lend AIG up to $85 billion under a secured revolving credit 
facility.”92 “As a condition to the loan . . . AIG also agreed to issue 
to a trust established for the benefit of the U.S. Treasury, a series of 
senior preferred stock”93 and warrants equal to approximately 80% of 
the economics and voting power of the company.94 
The loan was restructured in November to include loans to two 
new special-purpose vehicles.95 The Federal Reserve lent 
approximately $19.5 billion to Maiden Lane II so that the SPV 
could purchase MBS from AIG.96 It lent approximately $19.6 billion 
to Maiden Lane III so that the SPV could purchase from AIGFP’s 
 
89. Id.  
90. Id. at 4. 
91. Id. at 3–5. 
92. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 30 (citing Federal Reserve, Periodic Report Pursuant to 
Section 129(b) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Update on 
Outstanding Lending Facilities Authorized by the Board Under Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act 12 (Aug. 25, 2009). 
93. Id. at 31. 
94. Id. (“Because of the degree to which the deemed conversion of the AIG Series C 
Preferred Stock is dilutive to AIG’s common stockholders, the shares underlying Treasury’s 
warrants, which are not adjusted for the conversion, represent only a tiny fraction of the total 
voting power of AIG’s equity. As a result, the AIG Series C Preferred Stock currently 
represents approximately 79.8% of the total voting power.”) Id. at 3 n.60.  
95. “In addition to the Federal Reserve’s actions, Treasury also later acquired $40 
billion in senior preferred stock of AIG.” Id. at 31 n.61; see also Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 3–5 (Aug. 7, 2009). 
96. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 12, 2008). 
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counterparties $62 billion of CDOs that were “protected by 
AIGFP’s credit default swaps.”97 
 e. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF).  
 By the fall of 2008, . . . money market mutual funds [were] 
facing severe liquidity pressure. After the failure of a large money 
market mutual fund, Reserve Primary Fund, investors began a run 
on money market mutual funds that lasted for weeks. Redemptions 
totaled over $100 billion. In the face of redemptions, money 
market mutual funds had to start selling assets, including . . . 
commercial paper . . . .98  
Because of these fire sales, commercial paper issuers started to 
face liquidity pressures of their own, forcing many of them to draw 
on back-up lines of credit from banks. This put further pressure on 
the banking system because most banks had not anticipated that so 
many of these back-up facilities would be drawn at once. “In order 
to address the fire sales of commercial paper as a result of 
redemption pressures and the lack of liquidity in the commercial 
paper market, the Federal Reserve created the AMLF and the 
CPFF.”99 
“The AMLF was authorized by the Federal Reserve on 
September 19, 2008 to provide funding to U.S. depository 
institutions and bank holding companies and their U.S. broker-
dealer subsidiaries to finance purchases of high-quality asset-backed 
commercial paper from money market mutual funds.”100 The CPFF 
was authorized on October 14, 2008, to establish a special-purpose 
vehicle to purchase three-month unsecured and asset-backed 
commercial paper directly from eligible issuers, including any U.S. 
commercial paper issuer including those with foreign parents.101 
 
97. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 32; Am. Int’l Group, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) 
(Nov. 25, 2008). 
98. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 32. 
99. Id. (citing Brian F. Madigan, Dir., Div. of Monetary Affairs, Fed. Reserve, Bagehot’s 
Dictum in Practice: Formulating and Implementing Policies to Combat the Financial Crisis, 
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium (Aug. 21, 
2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/madigan20090821 
a.htm). 
 100. Id. at 33. 
 101. Id. 
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 f. Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). 
 The financial crisis has deeply affected the securitization market. 
In a period of months, the pendulum swung from a condition in 
which the financial markets assigned too low a value to the risk of 
certain securitization asset classes—such as subprime mortgages—
to one in which seemingly the only securities that were readily 
marketable were those with an explicit or implicit government 
backing. Issuance of securities backed by credit card receivables and 
auto loans slowed to a trickle, and the sale of new commercial 
[MBS] (CMBS) ceased altogether. The absence of a functioning 
securitization market in turn severely constrained the practical 
ability of banks and other financial institutions to extend new loans 
to consumers and businesses.102 
 In an effort to revive the [asset-backed securities] (ABS) markets 
and provide “a critical channel for supply of new credit to 
households,”103 the Federal Reserve created TALF, which began 
operations in March 2009 under the administration of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.104 Recently, Secretary Geithner 
characterized TALF as “[o]ne of the most important” Federal 
Reserve programs.105 Through TALF, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York provides non-recourse loans to borrowers, secured by 
qualifying non-mortgage-backed ABS and, more recently, CMBS. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is expected to lend up to 
$200 billion, but TALF may be expanded to allow the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York to lend as much as $1 trillion. TALF is 
scheduled to stop making new loans on March 31, 2010 for non-
mortgage-backed ABS and legacy CMBS and on June 30, 2010 for 
newly issued CMBS.106 
 Initially greeted with tepid interest, the program has since 
gained momentum. Through September 2009, investors have 
 
 102. Id. at 144. 
 103. Id. (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, THE NEXT PHASE OF GOVERNMENT 
FINANCIAL STABILIZATION AND REHABILITATION POLICIES 3 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at 
http://treas.gov/press/releases/docs/Next%20Phase%20of%20Financial%20Policy,%20Final,
%202009-09-14.pdf.). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (quoting Written Testimony of Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner: Hearing 
Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Timothy Geithner, 
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/ 
testimony-091009-geithner.pdf.). 
 106. Id. at 144–45. 
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requested $46.5 billion worth of TALF loans to purchase eligible 
ABS.107 
2. Treasury programs 
The original vision of the TARP was that Treasury would 
purchase up to $700 billion of “troubled assets” from “financial 
institutions.”108  
The TARP facility was expected to be used to purchase mortgages 
and other real-estate related assets in order to stabilize, enhance or 
at least establish reliable market values for illiquid assets.  
That original vision, however, was never implemented. Instead, 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve quickly abandoned that plan and 
used TARP funds to make direct investments in the US financial 
system through [the Capital Purchase Program].109 
 a. Capital Purchase Program (CPP). The CPP earmarked $250 
billion for direct investments in U.S. financial institutions.  
 When the CPP was officially announced, regulators had already 
summoned the CEOs of the nation’s nine largest financial 
institutions to a meeting in Washington to inform them that their 
institutions had been designated as systemically important, and that 
therefore they would, whether they or their boards felt their 
institutions needed it or not, sign the term sheets put in front of 
them and accept the government investment.110 The CEOs of these 
institutions all signed the one-page term sheets that day, which 
formed the basis of securities purchase agreements for the purchase 
 
 107. Id. at 145 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, THE NEXT PHASE OF GOVERNMENT 
FINANCIAL STABILIZATION AND REHABILITATION POLICIES 38 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at 
http://treas.gov/press/releases/docs/Next%20Phase%20of%20Financial%20Policy,%20Final,
%202009-09-14.pdf). 
 108. Id. at 41. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 69 (citing Joe Weisenthal, Documents Reveal How Paulson Forced Banks to 
Take TARP Cash, BUS. INSIDER, May 13, 2009, available at http://www. 
businessinsider.com/uncovered-tarp-docs-reveal-howpaulson-forced-banks-to-take-the-cash-
2009-5; Joanna Ossinger, Report: Paulson Told Banks They Must Take TARP Money, FOX BUS., 
May 13, 2009, available at http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/report-paulson-told-banks-
tarp-money/; David Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 236–241 (2009)). 
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of preferred stock and warrants that were later signed by the 
financial institutions.111  
Unlike the preferred stock the government purchased from 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG, this preferred stock was not 
senior to outstanding preferred stock. Instead, it was pari passu. In 
addition, the warrants were for a relatively small amount of common 
stock rather than 80% of the company. These terms reflected a 
fundamental shift in policy from a focus on preventing moral hazard 
to a focus on restoring public confidence in the U.S. financial 
system. 
 After Treasury set aside $125 billion for the nine largest 
financial institutions . . . it offered the remaining $125 billion to 
other U.S. banking institutions, including regional and community 
banks, but only the banking institutions [other than the top nine] 
that were determined to be “healthy.”112 Indeed, after the initial 
announcement, many regional financial institutions requested CPP 
investments to avoid being tainted as “unhealthy.” There was 
widespread fear that banks that did not request CPP investments 
would suffer deposit runs and possibly failure because their 
customers would conclude that they were unhealthy.113 
 
 111. Id. (“For one version of the events leading up to the meeting where the regulators 
announced to the nine largest bank holding companies that they had no choice but to accept 
such capital, see David Wessel, IN FED WE TRUST 236–41 (2009).”). Id. at 69 n.5.  
 112. Id. at 70. Recently, the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (“SIGTARP”), issued a report describing the CPP as a program for 
“healthy banks,” and questioning whether all of the nine largest financial institutions were in 
fact considered by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve to be “healthy” at the time. See 
Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Emergency 
Capital Injections Provided to Support the Viability of Bank of America, Other Major Banks, and 
the U.S. Financial System (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/ 
audit/2009/Emergency_Capital_Injections_Provided_to_Support_the_Viability_of_Bank_of_
America.._100509.pdf. This criticism fundamentally mischaracterizes what the U.S. Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve said and did at the time. Indeed, the reason all nine were required to 
receive TARP money, rather than making it a fully voluntary choice, is that the U.S. Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve wanted to avoid characterizations of which ones of these large nine 
institutions were healthy or not at the time because they believed that sort of characterization 
would deepen the panic already underway. Instead, healthiness determinations were reserved 
to banks and bank holding companies that applied for some of the second $125 billion of CPP 
money. 
 113. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 70. 
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 b. Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program. 
 On November 10, 2008, Treasury announced a restructuring of 
the government’s financial support to AIG. As part of that 
overhaul, Treasury indicated that it would purchase $40 billion of 
newly issued preferred stock, under the Systemically Significant 
Failing Institutions Program, with the proceeds used in part to 
reduce the total amount available under AIG’s September 22, 2008 
secured revolving credit agreement with the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York.114 
 c. Targeted Investment Program. 
 Treasury first issued guidelines for the Targeted Investment 
Program on January 2, 2009, after previously announcing its 
investment in Citigroup on November 22, 2008, and beginning 
discussions with Bank of America about additional TARP 
investments in December 2008 in anticipation of the closing of its 
purchase of Merrill Lynch on January 1, 2009.115 
 Treasury has invested $20 billion each via the Targeted 
Investment Program in both Citigroup and Bank of America by 
purchasing perpetual preferred securities. Treasury’s investment 
supplements the initial TARP investments made under the CPP in 
these financial institutions.116 
 d. Asset Guarantee Program. 
 The Asset Guarantee Program was announced as a package with 
the Targeted Investment Program. Under the Asset Guarantee 
Program, the U.S. government entered into a definitive agreement 
with Citigroup to share losses with respect to a pool of $301 billion 
in assets of Citigroup. Although the government agreed to the 
terms of a similar program with Bank of America with respect to a 
pool of $118 billion of assets, the majority of which were assumed 
as a result of the Merrill Lynch acquisition, the parties never 
executed definitive documents for that program. On September 21, 
2009, Bank of America announced that it had reached an 
 
 114. Id. at 76. 
 115. Id. at 77. 
 116. Id. 
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agreement with regulators to pay a $425 million fee to terminate 
the term sheet.117 
 Citigroup agreed to absorb the first losses in its covered assets 
portfolio up to $39.5 billion. The Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, Treasury and the FDIC share any additional losses with 
Citigroup, with the government absorbing 90% of that loss and 
Citigroup 10%.118 Citigroup must manage the assets in the pool 
in accordance with guidance from a template issued by the 
government, including mortgage modification procedures adopted 
by the FDIC.119 
 e. Capital Assistance Program (CAP) and stress tests.  
 CAP was announced by Secretary Geithner on February 10, 
2009. There are two main components of CAP: 
stress tests to determine whether certain institutions need 
additional capital buffers; and 
a capital assistance program through which eligible public 
institutions may apply for capital infusions from Treasury. 
 The program’s emphasis on capital composition in the stress 
tests and preferred stock terms that add the ability to convert to 
common stock demonstrate Treasury’s continued concern with 
increasing tangible common equity in recipient financial 
institutions.120 
 CAP enables qualifying financial institutions (QFIs) to issue 
mandatory convertible preferred stock to Treasury in order to 
provide such institutions with contingent common equity “as a 
bridge to private capital in the future,” as is necessary to “retain the 
confidence of investors or to meet supervisory expectations 
regarding the amount and composition of capital.”121 The capital 
 
 117. Id. at 78 (citing Press Release, Bank of America, Bank of America Terminates Asset 
Guarantee Term Sheet (Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://newsroom.bankofamerica. 
com/index.php?s=43&item=8536); see also Margaret Popper and David Mildenberg, Bank of 
America to Pay $425 Million for Merrill Aid (Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Sept. 22, 2009, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a2c5hY E7Uv.Y. 
 118. Id. at 78–79. 
 119. Id. at 79. 
 120. Id. at 82. 
 121. Id. at 85 (quoting Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Joint 
Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner, Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Sheila Bair, and Comptroller of the Currency John C. Dugan (May 6, 
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infusions are meant to increase capital buffers at QFIs to guard 
against economic conditions that are worse than expected. QFIs 
that issue mandatory convertible preferred stock under CAP are 
also required to issue to Treasury warrants to purchase shares of the 
institution’s common stock. No QFI has asked for funds under 
CAP.122 Absent unusual circumstances or an extreme change in 
economic circumstances, it is unlikely that any CAP preferred will 
be issued.123 
 f. Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP). 
 PPIP is the latest U.S. government initiative to address the 
enduring problem of illiquid and troubled assets on financial 
institutions’ balance sheets. The program, announced by Secretary 
Geithner on March 23, 2009, was originally hailed as a vital 
component of the government’s plan to heal the financial sector. It 
received a warm welcome from Wall Street, with the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average rising 7% on the day of its announcement. 
Enthusiasm for PPIP waned over the following months, however, 
falling off particularly sharply after the results of the stress tests 
were announced on May 7, 2009, during which time it became 
clear that large financial institutions, at least, were once again able 
to tap the capital markets and would, therefore, be less likely to use 
PPIP to sell troubled assets, and as concerns were raised about the 
intersection of sales and mark-to-market accounting.124 
 As originally contemplated, PPIP had two halves: the Legacy 
Securities Program run by Treasury and the Legacy Loans Program 
run by the FDIC. Both programs contemplated the formation of 
investment funds capitalized with equity from Treasury and private 
investors to be leveraged with potentially attractive government 
financing in the form of either direct loans or debt guarantees, each 
fund a public-private investment fund or PPIF.125 
 A key principle underlying PPIP was a belief that, with the 
assistance of government capital and leverage, the private sector 
could be induced to purchase these troubled and illiquid assets at 
 
2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ 
20090506a.htm). 
 122. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY OVERSIGHT REPORT: TARP REPAYMENTS, 
INCLUDING THE REPURCHASE OF STOCK WARRANTS (July 1, 2009), available at 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-071009-report.pdf. 
 123. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 85. 
 124. Id. at 181. 
 125. Id. 
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prices substantially in excess of the then-current market price. Both 
the government and the banks believed that such market prices 
simply reflected speculative “vulture” funds taking advantage of the 
distress of the banks and the dysfunctional credit markets to 
purchase assets at fractions of their underlying economic value.126 
 In June 2009, the FDIC indefinitely postponed the Legacy 
Loans Program, although in late summer of 2009 it held a pilot 
sale of receivership assets in a transaction that it hopes will serve as 
a template for transactions involving banks that have not been 
closed if and when the program is expanded to them. While 
Treasury has moved forward with the Legacy Securities Program, it 
faces numerous uncertainties. PPIP is now considerably smaller 
than originally anticipated, involving Treasury commitments of $30 
billion, down from the initial announcement of $75-$100 billion, 
and it is unclear whether the program has the scale to address the 
underlying problem.127 
 Valuation and accounting issues are central to understanding 
both the need for PPIP and the challenges affecting its success. 
Accounting rules do not require certain whole loans to be marked-
to-market, and many financial institutions understandably have not 
done so. Should financial institutions sell these assets at a material 
discount to par, potentially substantial losses would translate into 
significant depletion of capital. By contrast, accounting rules 
require MBS and CDOs to be marked-to-market if they are 
classified as either “trading securities” or “available-for-sale 
securities.” Because fair value accounting applies to MBS and 
CDOs, many such assets have already been marked down to market 
or near-market levels, potentially making these assets better 
candidates for sale through PPIP.128 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 182. Recently, the U.S. Treasury announced the initial closings of two funds 
established under the Legacy Securities Program, each with committed equity capital of $500 
million from private investors. Collectively, the public-private investment funds have closed on 
approximately $1.13 billion of private sector capital commitments, which have been matched 
100% by the U.S. Treasury, representing total equity capital commitments of $2.26 billion. 
The U.S. Treasury will also provide debt financing up to 100% of the total capital 
commitments of each fund. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Department 
Announces Initial Closings of Legacy securities Public-Private Investment Funds, Press Room 
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/tg304.htm. 
 128. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 182–83 (“In addition, the FDIC earlier this year 
reaffirmed a capital rule that requires banks to hold additional capital against subordinated 
tranches of certain ABS if the senior tranches of such securities have been downgraded. This 
increased capital obligation could potentially require ‘dollar for dollar’ capital against the asset, 
which would potentially make these assets candidates for sale through PPIP.”). Id. at 183 n.2. 
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 g. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. On September 6, 2008, the 
U.S. government took control of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as 
conservator, pursuant to the authority granted by HERA that 
Congress passed only several weeks prior.129 In connection with the 
conservatorship, the U.S. government provided each of the GSEs 
with up to $100 billion of direct financial assistance in the form of 
senior preferred stock and temporary access to the Federal Reserve’s 
discount window. The U.S. Treasury also agreed to purchase an 
unspecified amount of MBS backed by the GSEs in the open market. 
As part of its fee for providing the financial support, the U.S. 
Treasury took a 79.9% interest in the common stock of each 
institution. The rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is the largest 
government-assisted transaction in the U.S. history, as these two 
institutions hold or guarantee a combined $5.5 trillion of mortgage-
backed securities.  
To further boost market confidence in the two GSEs, on 
February 18, 2009, the U.S. Treasury announced that the funding 
commitments would be increased to $200 billion for each 
institution.130 As of October 1, 2009, Fannie Mae has received $44.9 
billion of direct financial assistance from the U.S. Treasury, and 
Freddie Mac has received $50.7 billion.131 The U.S. Treasury has 
also purchased a total of $181.5 billion of GSE MBS, as of October 
1, 2009.132 On top of the U.S. Treasury’s financial assistance, the 
Federal Reserve established programs to purchase up to a total of 
$200 billion direct obligations of the GSEs and to purchase up to a 
total of $1.25 trillion of MBS that are guaranteed by the GSEs.133 
 
 129. For more information, see Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., on Treasury 
and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 
7, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm.  
 130. See WHITE HOUSE BUDGET, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES, FISCAL 
YEAR 2010, available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/gov.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2010).  
 131. See Data as of October 1, 2009 on Treasury and Federal Reserve Purchase Programs 
for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities, available at http://www.fhfa.gov/ 
webfiles/14896/TreasFed9242009.pdf.  
 132. Id. at 116–17. 
 133. See Fed. Reserve Press Release (Mar. 18, 2009), available at www. 
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090318a.htm. As of October 1, 2009, the 
Federal Reserve has purchased a total of $133.8 billion of direct obligations of the GSEs and a 
total of $904.9 billion of GSE MBS. See Data as of October 1, 2009 on Treasury and Federal 
Reserve Purchase Programs for GSE and Mortgage-Related Securities, available at http:// 
www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/14896/TreasFed9242009.pdf.  
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The future of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae is uncertain. The 
U.S. Treasury’s White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform, 
released in June 2009, stated that the U.S. Treasury will report to 
Congress its recommendations on the future of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac at the time of the 2011 budget release.134 
3. FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP)  
“The FDIC Board approved the TLGP in October 2008 as part 
of an effort by the FDIC, the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve to 
stabilize the nation’s financial system.”135 There are two parts to the 
TLGP: the Debt Guarantee Program and the Transaction Account 
Guarantee Program. Through the Debt Guarantee Program, the 
FDIC guarantees certain senior unsecured debt issued by 
participating insured depository institutions, their holding 
companies, or their affiliates.136 Through the Transaction Account 
Guarantee Program, the FDIC provides unlimited deposit insurance 
for certain transaction accounts at participating insured depository 
institutions. 
The Debt Guarantee Program has been highly attractive to 
participating entities, particularly the larger bank holding 
companies, because it provides access to funding at relatively low 
cost. Regardless of the participating entity’s credit rating, the three 
major credit rating agencies rate debt issued under the TLGP with 
their highest ratings based on the FDIC guarantee. Most fixed-rate 
debt issued under the Debt Guarantee Program bears an annual 
interest rate between 1.5% and 3%.137  
 
 134. Department of the Treasury, Financial Regulatory Reform, A NEW FOUNDATION: 
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (June 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. In the White Paper, the 
U.S. Treasury listed a number of options for the reform of the GSEs, including: (i) returning 
them to their previous status as GSEs with the paired interests of maximizing returns for 
private shareholders and pursuing public policy home ownership goals; (ii) the gradual wind-
down of their operations and liquidation of their assets; (iii) incorporating the GSEs’ functions 
into a federal agency; (iv) a public utility model where the government regulates the GSEs’ 
profit margin, sets guarantee fees, and provides explicit backing for GSE commitments; (v) 
conversion to providing insurance for covered bonds; and (vi) the dissolution of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac into many smaller companies. See id. at 41–42, available at http://www. 
financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
 135. DPFCM, supra note 33, at 116. 
 136. Id. at 117. 
 137. Id. (citing Marshall Eckblad, Banks Repaying TARP Still Enjoy Vast Government 
Debt Aid, NASDAQ, June 12, 2009, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-
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The FDIC is now winding down the Debt Guarantee Program, with 
October 31, 2009, as the last day for a participating entity to issue 
guaranteed debt. The FDIC is considering the establishment of a 
limited, six-month emergency guarantee facility following the 
expiration of the Debt Guarantee Program on October 31, 2009. 
“Entities that issue debt under the emergency guarantee facility 
would be permitted to issue FDIC-guaranteed debt through April 
30, 2010.”138 
Under the FDIC’s general deposit insurance program, deposits 
that are not subject to the transaction account guarantee are insured 
up to $250,000 per person per institution, through December 31, 
2013.139 The Transaction Account Guarantee Program provides 
unlimited insurance coverage for any balances in a non-interest 
bearing transaction account through June 30, 2010.140 
B. U.K. Programs 
The U.K. programs designed to battle the financial crisis consist 
primarily of:141 HM Treasury’s Bank Recapitalisation Fund to make 
capital available to eligible banks and building societies, its Credit 
Guarantee Scheme to guarantee certain senior unsecured debt and 
other liabilities of eligible institutions, its Asset Protection Scheme to 
insure against losses for certain asset pools of certain targeted banks, 
and a permanent increase in the deposit compensation limit from 
£35,000 to £50,000; programs implemented by the Bank of England 
 
news-story.aspx?storyid=200906121341dowjonesdjonline000736&title=banks-repaying-tarp-
still-enjoy-vast-government-debt-aid.). 
 138. Id. at 126. See FDIC, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (Sept. 9, 2009), 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/NoticeSept9no6.pdf (proposing alternatives for 
concluding the debt guarantee program of the TLGP). 
 139. See Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111–22, 123 Stat. 
1632 (2009) (amending § 13(c)(4)(G)(ii) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 
1823(c)(4)). 
 140. Despite outcries from some critics in the United States that the extraordinary 
measures taken by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC in response to the recent 
global financial crisis threaten to transform the United States economy from a capitalistic 
system to a socialistic one, the measures that have been taken have stopped well short of the 
sort of nationalization that has resulted from government interventions in the past, including 
in ancient times. See, e.g., Genesis 47:13–26, which describes how the seven years of famine 
ended with Pharaoh having acquired all the money, cattle, and land of Egypt, and reduced the 
population to a sort of voluntary servitude. 
 141. For more information, see Davis Polk & Wardell, UK and US Financial Rescue 
Packages (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.davispolk.com/1485409/clientmemos/ 
2009/01.28.09.UK.US.FRP.survey.pdf.  
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to increase liquidity to financial systems through the Asset Purchase 
Facility and other liquidity facilities; and the institution of a special 
resolution regime for banks and building societies.  
1. HM Treasury programs 
On October 8, 2008, HM Treasury announced a package of 
rescue measures, including the establishment of a £50 billion Bank 
Recapitalization Fund and a Credit Guarantee Scheme of up to £250 
billion.142 On January 19, 2009, HM Treasury announced an Asset 
Protection Scheme when the initial phase of rescue measures proved 
insufficient to stabilize the financial system.143 
 a. Bank Recapitalisation Fund. The eligible institutions for HM 
Treasury’s Bank Recapitalisation Fund are U.K. incorporated banks 
(including U.K. subsidiaries of foreign institutions) that have a 
“substantial business” in the United Kingdom and building societies. 
When the Bank Recapitalisation Fund capital injection program was 
announced on October 8, 2008, seven major U.K. banks and the 
largest building society were expected to participate in the 
program.144 The £50 billion was ultimately taken by only two major 
banks, the Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBSG), and the merged 
Lloyds TSB/HBOS.145 The initial round of capital injections took 
the form of preferred shares. HM Treasury later bought ordinary 
shares in these two banks (in part by conversion of the preferred 
 
 142. See HM TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS 9 (July 8, 2009) 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming_financial_markets080709.pdf; HM Treasury, 
Financial Support to the Banking Industry (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_100_08.htm. 
 143. See HM Treasury, Statement on the Government’s Asset Protection Scheme (Jan. 19, 
2009), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_07_09.htm.  
 144. See HM Treasury, Financial Support to the Banking Industry (Oct. 8, 2008), 
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_100_08.htm. The institutions expected to 
participate were Abbey National, Barclays, HBOS, HSBC Bank plc, Lloyds TSB, Nationwide 
Building Society, the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, and Standard Chartered. 
 145. See HM Treasury, Treasury Statement on Financial Support to the Banking Industry 
(Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_105_08.htm; HM 
Treasury, Treasury Statement on Restructuring its Investment in RBS to Deliver Further Bank 
Lending to Industry and Homeowners (Oct. 13, 2008), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_06_09.htm; HM Treasury, Asset Protection Scheme (Feb. 26, 2009), 
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/statement_chx_260209.htm [hereinafter Asset 
Protection Scheme]; HM Treasury, Asset Protection Scheme—Agreement with Lloyds (Mar. 7, 
2009), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_23_09.htm.  
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shares invested earlier), resulting in the government owning 84% of 
RBSG and 43.5% of Lloyds TSB/HBOS.146 
 b. Credit Guarantee Scheme.147 The Credit Guarantee Scheme 
provides guarantees of new short- and medium-term senior 
unsecured debt issued by U.K.-incorporated banks, including certain 
U.K. subsidiaries of foreign institutions. Unlike the United States’ 
TLGP, which charged a flat fee varying with maturity, the cost of the 
Credit Guarantee Scheme is linked to the participating institution’s 
median five-year credit default swap spreads from July 2, 2007 to 
July 1, 2008, applied retrospectively. In comparison to the United 
States’ TLGP, where the Federal Reserve determined the risk 
weighting of FDIC-guaranteed obligations would be 20% for risk-
based capital purposes, the FSA determined the risk weighting for 
HM Treasury-guaranteed obligations to be zero. Apart from senior 
unsecured debt, the Credit Guarantee Scheme was later extended to 
provide credit enhancement on other types of bank liabilities, such as 
certain eligible triple-A rated asset-backed securities, including those 
backed by mortgages and corporate and consumer debt.148 
 c. Asset Protection Scheme. Similar to the structure in the U.S. 
Asset Guarantee Program, the U.K. Asset Protection Scheme 
provides protection against losses on a defined asset pool above a 
certain threshold. The U.K. Asset Protection Scheme was used by 
HM Treasury to intervene in two major banks, RBS and Lloyds 
TSB/HBOS.149 The U.K. government agreed to share losses with 
RBS with respect to an asset pool of £325 billion. RBS would bear 
the first portion of any losses, up to a total first loss of 6% or some 
£20 billion. After that, the U.K. government would bear the risk on 
up to 90% of any additional losses. RBS would pay a fee of 2% of the 
value of the assets insured, or approximately £6.5 billion. In the case 
of Lloyds TSB/HBOS, the asset pool is £260 billion. Lloyds 
 
 146. See Asset Protection Scheme, supra note 145; HM Treasury, Asset Protection Scheme - 
Agreement with Lloyds (Mar. 7, 2009), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov. 
uk/press_23_09.htm [hereinafter Lloyds]. 
 147. See generally United Kingdom Debt Management Office, 2008 Credit Guarantee 
Scheme, available at http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page=CGS/CGS_about (last visited 
Jan. 15 2010).  
 148. See generally United Kingdom Debt Management Office, 2009 Asset-Backed 
Securities Guarantee Scheme, available at http://www.dmo.gov.uk/index.aspx?page= 
CGS/ABS_about (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).  
 149. See HM Treasury, Asset Protection Scheme (Feb. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/statement_chx_260209.htm; Lloyds, supra note 146. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/26/2010 8:05 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
454 
TSB/HBOS agreed to bear the first losses on up to 9.6% of the asset 
pool, or some £25 billion, and to pay a guarantee fee of 6% of the 
assets insured, or £15.6 billion. As with the RBS program, the U.K. 
government would bear the losses on up to 90% of any additional 
losses in the pool. 
In connection to entering the Asset Protection Program with 
HM Treasury, the banks agreed to quantified lending commitments. 
For instance, RBS agreed to lend an additional £25 billion on 
commercial terms for mortgages and businesses on top of its current 
scale of lending both in 2009 and 2010. Lloyds TSB/HBOS agreed 
to lend an additional £14 billion on similar terms. 
2. Bank of England programs 
In response to the financial crisis, the Bank of England lowered 
its official Bank Rate to 1.5%, the lowest rate since the creation of 
the central bank in 1694. To provide more liquidity to the financial 
system, the Bank of England established the Asset Purchase Facility 
to purchase certain high quality private sector assets, and other 
liquidity facilities, such as the Special Liquidity Scheme.  
a. Asset Purchase Facility. On January 19, 2009, the Bank of 
England announced the Asset Purchase Facility with an initial 
commitment of up to £50 billion, which was expanded later up to 
£125 billion.150 In comparison to the Federal Reserve programs, the 
Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility is much smaller in scale. 
Also, unlike the Federal Reserve’s program, the Asset Purchase 
Facility had to be authorized and guaranteed by HM Treasury, with 
the main parameters of the programs being set by the Treasury.151  
 
 150. See Press Release, HM Treasury, Statement on Financial Intervention to Support 
Lending in the Economy (Jan. 19, 2009), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/press_05_09.htm; Press Release, Bank of Eng., Bank of England Reduces 
Bank Rate by 0.5 Percentage Points to 0.5% and Announces £75 Billion Asset Purchase 
Programme (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
publications/news/2009/019.htm; Press Release, Bank of Eng., Bank of England Maintains 
Bank Rate at 0.5% and Increases Size of Asset Purchase Programme by £50 Billion to £125 
Billion (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ publications/news/ 
2009/037.htm; Press Release, Bank of Eng., Bank of England Maintains Bank Rate at 0.5% 
and Increases Size of Asset Purchase Programme by £50 Billion to £175 Billion (Aug. 6, 
2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/ news/2009/063.htm.  
 151. See Letter from HM Treasury to Bank of Eng. (Jan. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/ck_letter_Bank of England290109.pdf; Letter from Bank 
of Eng. to HM Treasury (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ 
markets/apfgovletter090129.pdf.  
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Many types of high quality private sector assets are covered by 
the Asset Purchase Facility, including debt issued under the Credit 
Guarantee Scheme, corporate bonds, commercial paper, syndicated 
loans, certain asset-backed securities, and gilts. 
 b. Other liquidity facilities. Other Bank of England liquidity 
facilities consist primarily of the Special Liquidity Scheme, the 
Discount Window Facility and the expansion of its long-term repo 
operations. The Special Liquidity Scheme allows authorized 
institutions to swap illiquid assets of sufficiently high quality for U.K. 
Treasury Bills for up to three years.152 The Scheme was designed to 
finance certain illiquid assets on banks’ balance sheets by exchanging 
them temporarily for more easily tradable assets. Under the Discount 
Window Facility, effective February 2, 2009, the Bank of England 
permits eligible banks and building societies to borrow gilts, for 30 
or 364 days, against a wide range of collateral in return for a fee.153 
With respect to its long-term repo operations, the Bank of England 
increased the amount and frequency of its three-month lending and 
expanded the range of collateral eligible in those operations to 
include asset-backed securities, among other things. 
3. Special resolution regimes for banks and building societies 
Until early this year, the U.K. insolvency laws did not distinguish 
banks from other commercial companies. The Banking Act 2009 
(Banking Act) instituted a special resolution regime (SRR) for U.K.-
incorporated banks and building societies, effectively replacing the 
Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, an emergency piece of 
legislation to deal with the Northern Rock crisis.154 The Banking Act 
 
 152. For more information, see Bank of England, Special Liquidity Scheme, 
http://www. bankofengland.co.uk/markets/sls/index.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
 153. See Bank of England, Sterling Money Market Operations Discount Window Facility, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/money/discount/index.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 
2010).  
 154. See The Banking Act, 2009 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/ 
acts2009/pdf/ukpga_20090001_en.pdf. For more information, see generally ALLEN & 
OVERY, NEW INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES FOR BANKS AND BUILDING SOCIETIES (Apr. 2009), 
available at http://elink.allenovery.com/getFile.aspx?ItemType=Bulletin&id=7b961018-
03c0-4691-8d86-c50f35954edd; LINKLATERS, THE BANKING ACT 2009 AND ITS IMPACT ON 
UK BANKS AND THEIR STAKEHOLDERS AND COUNTERPARTIES (Mar. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.linexlegal.com/content.php?content_id=83703; SLAUGHTER AND MAY, A BRIEF 
GUIDE TO THE BANKING ACT OF 2009 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www. 
slaughterandmay.com/media/786586/financing_briefing_a_brief_guide_to_the_banking_act
_2008_mar_2009.pdf.  
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aims to provide the U.K. government with new tools to deal with 
failing banks and building societies. The Banking Act does not apply 
to an investment bank and the U.K. government is currently 
developing a separate resolution mechanism for investment banks.  
Under the Banking Act, the FSA has the authority to trigger the 
regime if a bank has failed or is likely to fail to meet certain FSA-
defined threshold conditions. Once the SRR is triggered, the Bank 
of England is responsible for managing and executing the resolution 
process and the Treasury is responsible for some key decisions such 
as financing or nationalization. Under the Banking Act, there are 
three stabilization options: (i) the Bank of England has the power to 
transfer all or part of a failing bank to a private sector purchaser; (ii) 
the Bank of England has the power to transfer all or part of a failing 
bank to a bridge bank established by the Bank of England; and (iii) 
the Treasury may take a bank into temporary public ownership by 
transferring its shares either to a nominee of the Treasury or a 
company wholly owned by the Treasury. In the case of a partial 
transfer, either to a private sector purchaser or a bridge bank, the 
residual bank would be placed into a “special bank administration” 
procedure, with the primary objective being to support the private 
sector purchaser or the bridge bank. The Bank of England, in 
conjunction with a bank administrator, executes the “special bank 
administration” procedure.  
Since the passage of the Banking Act, Dunfermline Building 
Society was the first case under the SRR.155 Some part of 
Dunfermline’s assets and liabilities was transferred to Nationwide 
Building Society and some part was placed into a bridge bank, 
wholly owned by the Bank of England. The assets and liabilities held 
by the bridge bank were sold later in a competitive auction process. 
The remainder of Dunfermline’s business was placed into the 
“special bank administration” procedure.156 
C. Other European Programs 
The financial crisis has prompted actions from the European 
Commission and many national governments. In the European 
Union, all rescue packages by national governments are subject to 
 
 155. See HM TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS, CM 7667, 31 (2009), 
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/reforming_ financial_markets080709.pdf. 
 156. Id. 
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the European Commission’s state aid review as part of the EU’s 
competition policy.157 To allow swift implementation of national 
measures, the European Commission issued a series of 
Communications to provide a European framework of rescue 
operations and streamline the approval procedures.158 The discussion 
below is informed primarily by two recent BIS reports and provides 
only a short summary of the various rescue programs instituted by 
the major European nations.159 
1. Capital injections160  
All major European nations, including France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, established capital injection 
schemes. The Italian and Spanish programs were not used because of 
their relatively healthy banking sectors, which were less affected by 
the financial crisis. The eligible institutions are typically depository 
institutions, though the programs in France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands also include insurance companies.  
 
 157. See, e.g., Europa.eu, Competition, http://europa.eu/pol/comp/index_en.htm (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
 158. For more information, see Commission of the European Communities, COM (2009) 
164 final (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/ 
studies_reports/2009_spring_en.pdf; Communication from the Commission—The 
Application of State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in Relation to Financial Institutions in the 
Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis (EC) 25 Oct. 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 270) 8, 8–
14, (the Banking Communication), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008XC1025(01):EN:NOT; Communication from 
the Commission—The Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions in the Current Financial Crisis: 
Limitation of Aid to the Minimum Necessary and Safeguards Against Undue Distortion of 
Competition (EC) 15 Jan. 2009, 2009 O.J. (C 10) 2, 2–10 (the Recapitalization 
Communication), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=CELEX:52009XC0115(01):EN:NOT; Communication from the Commission on the 
Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector (EC) 26 Mar. 2009, 2009 
O.J. (C 72) 1, 1–22 (the Impaired Assets Communication), available at http: 
//eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009XC0326(01):EN:NOT; 
Commission Communication on the Return to Viability and the Assessment of Restructuring 
Measures in the Financial Sector in the Current Crisis Under the State Aid Rules (EC) 19 Aug. 
2009, 2009 O.J. (C 195) 9, 9–20 (the Restructuring Communication), available at http: 
//eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009XC0819(03):EN:NOT.  
 159. See generally Fabio Panetta et al., An Assessment of Financial Sector Rescue 
Programmes, (Bank for International Settlements, BIS Papers No. 48, July 2009) [hereinafter 
BIS I], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap48.pdf?noframes=1; 2009 BANK 
FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS ANN. REP. 79 [hereinafter BIS II], available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2009e.pdf?noframes=1.  
 160. See BIS I, supra note 159, at 20–22; BIS II, supra note 159, at 106–07.  
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Most of the capital injections take the form of preferred shares 
and, in the case of France, subordinated debt (which was later 
allowed to be converted to preferred shares). In terms of pricing, the 
annual dividend for preferred shares of the European programs was 
set according to the guidelines by the European Central Bank, 
ranging from 6–9.3% depending on the degree of subordination. 
Similar to the U.S. programs, some EU programs also require 
warrants for ordinary shares issued to governments to give them the 
potential for upside returns. The capital injections all carry some 
combination of restrictions in executive compensation, dividend 
payments and adoption of appropriate business strategy or 
restructuring plans.  
2. Debt guarantees161  
Debt guarantee programs were also adopted in almost all 
European countries. The programs applied to domestic banks, and 
most of them also cover domestic subsidiaries of foreign banks. The 
eligible instruments are mostly newly issued senior unsecured debt 
with maturity terms usually ranging from three to five years. Some 
programs also cover shorter-term instruments such as certificates of 
deposit and commercial papers, but other programs explicitly 
exclude very short-term liabilities.  
In terms of cost, most EU programs are linked to the issuers’ 
median credit default swap (CDS) spreads over some historical 
period. By comparison, the United States’ TLGP charges a flat fee 
that varies with maturity. Apart from debt guarantee programs, some 
European countries also increased their deposit insurance coverage, 
either temporarily or permanently, such as Germany, Italy, and 
Switzerland. 
3. Asset guarantees162 
In comparison to programs for capital injections and debt 
guarantees that have been adopted in nearly all countries, asset 
guarantee programs have been rare. Apart from the Asset Protection 
Scheme in the United Kingdom, there is only one stand-alone case 
 
 161. See BIS I, supra note 159, at 23–25; BIS II, supra note 159, at 103, 106.  
 162. See BIS I, supra note 159, at 10–11, 26–27; BIS II, supra note 159, at 107.  
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in Europe—namely, the Dutch guarantee of certain assets held by 
ING. 
4. Asset purchases163  
Asset purchase programs are even scarcer in Europe. So far, only 
Germany has announced a general program to purchase impaired 
assets. In Germany, a draft law from May 2009 authorized the 
establishment of a new facility to swap toxic assets from banks for 
government-guaranteed bonds, but the program has not yet been 
implemented. 
Though not part of a general program, the Swiss National Bank 
purchased $38.7 billion of toxic assets from UBS Switzerland and 
placed them into an SPV. Most of the purchased assets were U.S. 
real estate related. The Swiss National Bank provided 90% of the 
financing in the form of secured lending and UBS provided the rest 
in the form of equity and agreed to take the first loss on these assets. 
5. Bank insolvency laws and nationalizations 
The financial crisis exposed the constraints of the national bank 
insolvency regimes, prompting many EU countries to pass or 
consider legislation to institute special resolution regimes for banks 
and other financial institutions.164 Before the financial crisis, most 
EU national governments did not have laws on their books allowing 
them to take over failing banks. As mentioned above, the U.K. 
government passed the legislation for a special bank resolution 
regime (SRR) in response to its experiences of dealing with the crisis 
of Northern Rock. The near-collapse of Hypo Real Estate Holding 
AG prompted the German government to pass a special legislation 
primarily for the purpose of taking over that failing institution. 
Currently, the German government is debating whether a special 
bank insolvency procedure should be put in place that would apply 
generally to all banks.165 
 
 163. See BIS I, supra note 159, at 25–26; BIS II, supra note 159, at 107.  
 164. See Matthew Dalton, Europeans Review Bank Rules, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124757731423738667.html. 
 165. See Geoffrey T. Smith, Germany to Create New Power to Take Over Insolvent Banks, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB124950875633709055.html; Andrea Thomas, BaFin’s Sanio Calls for FDIC-like Body For 
Germany, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB124895957063693663.html.  
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In the case of Fortis, the Dutch government had the legal 
authority to take over the Dutch arm of Fortis and used it to 
nationalize it after an initial capital injection failed to stabilize the 
bank. In comparison, the Belgian government, however, did not 
have such powers, which complicated its handling of the Belgian arm 
of Fortis, as the shareholders were able to block a government-
orchestrated sale of Fortis’s Belgian banking assets to BNP Paribas 
SA for more than six months.166 In light of the Fortis experience, the 
Belgian government is also drafting legislation for a special bank 
resolution regime. 
6. European Central Bank (ECB)167  
Since October 2008, the ECB cut its key policy rate by a total of 
325 basis points to a historical low of 1%. Because of the euro area’s 
largely bank-centered financial system, the ECB’s actions to provide 
liquidity focused mostly on the banking sector.168 Similar to the 
actions of central banks in the United States and United Kingdom, 
the ECB relaxed standards for eligible collateral, expanded 
counterparty coverage, and lengthened the maturity of refinancing 
operations from one week to six months. Instead of competitive 
auctioning for a given amount of credit as during normal times, the 
ECB followed a “fixed rate full allotment” procedure, essentially 
granting banks unlimited liquidity.  
With respect to asset purchases, the ECB’s asset purchase 
program is minimal with a total commitment of €60 billion. Eligible 
assets include only covered bonds. 
 
 166. See Jan Brockmeijer, Deputy Dir., IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Dep’t, Lessons 
of the Crisis for EU Financial Supervisory Policy, Remarks at the IMF-Bruegel-National Bank of 
Belgium Conference: After the Storm: The Future Face of Europe’s Financial System (Mar. 
24, 2009), available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2009/eurfin/pdf/ 
brockm.pdf. 
 167. See Jean-Claude Trichet, President, European Cent. Bank, Supporting the Financial 
System and the Economy: Key ECB Policy Actions in the Crisis, Speech at the Nueva Economía 
Fórum-Wall Street Journal Europe Conference (June 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090622.en.html.  
 168. President Trichet stated that the Euro financial system is largely bank-centered, 
whereas the U.S. system is more market-based. At the end of 2007, total outstanding bank 
loans to the private sector amounted to about 145% of GDP in the euro area, while the 
corresponding figure for bank loans in the U.S. is only 63%. See id.  
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III. REGULATORY REFORM DESIGNED TO PREVENT FUTURE CRISES 
The U.S. and international regulatory proposals designed to 
prevent future financial crises, or at least reduce their likelihood or 
severity, are still in the process of being formed and discussed. I will 
summarize the current U.S., U.K., and other European proposals, as 
well as the G-20 proposals for worldwide financial regulatory reform. 
A. U.S. Proposals 
The financial crisis has created a perfect storm for more 
regulation in the United States. Many U.S. regulators and 
policymakers have stressed the lack of adequate regulatory or 
supervisory powers as one of the causes of the global financial crisis. 
As a result, there have been various proposals from the Obama 
Administration, from Democrats and Republicans in the U.S. 
Congress, and from other stakeholders, for how the financial 
regulatory system in the United States should be reformed or 
overhauled to prevent a future crisis from occurring, or at least 
reduce its likelihood or severity. 
1. Alleged flaws in the U.S. financial oversight system 
Among the alleged flaws in the U.S. financial oversight system 
that contributed to the financial crisis is the criticism that there are 
too many regulators in the United States with overlapping, and in 
some cases insufficiently overlapping, jurisdictions and mandates.169 
It is true that, as a result of historical development rather than 
national planning, a single financial institution in the United States 
can find itself subject to the jurisdiction of a wide swath of regulators 
by business subsidiary and across business lines, and that different 
financial institutions can find themselves subject to differing 
regulation depending on historical circumstance. This can lead to 
inefficiencies in regulation, can provide opportunities for regulatory 
arbitrage, and can result in regulators pointing fingers at each other 
when the system goes awry. 
In fact, one of the main criticisms of the system is that no single 
regulator was responsible for overseeing risk within the financial 
system as a whole.170 No single regulator, or collection of 
 
 169. Joe Nocera, Knee Jerks for Reform Are Overdue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, at C1. 
 170. It’s the Regulations, Not the Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A30. 
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coordinated regulators, had the authority or the resources to collect 
information system-wide or to use that information to take corrective 
action in a timely manner across financial institutions and markets 
regardless of charter. For example, one of the lessons learned from 
recent experience is that a sector of the market, such as the mortgage 
brokerage industry, can be systemically important, even though no 
single institution in that sector is a significant player. A single 
regulator with responsibility for overseeing systemic risk could 
identify and move to regulate such a sector. 
Finally, the current system provides no authority designed to 
empower a federal regulatory agency to control the resolution of a 
financial institution during a financial crisis, leaving the choice as 
between a so-called “bailout,” and allowing the institution to fail and 
file for bankruptcy, as occurred with Lehman Brothers.171 
These and other alleged flaws in the current system have 
amplified the calls for reform of the current regulatory system. 
2. Four models for financial regulatory reform 
Generally speaking, there are four global models for financial 
regulation: (1) institutional regulation, where supervision is based on 
the type of entity, such as a bank, insurance company, broker-dealer, 
etc.; (2) functional regulation, where supervision is based on 
function, such as securities activities, insurance, banking, investment 
advice, etc.; (3) a “twin peaks” model of regulation, where there is a 
separation of supervisory functions between two separate regulators, 
one which is responsible for prudential supervision, and the other 
which is responsible for conduct-of-business supervision; and (4) an 
integrated model of regulation, such as exists in the United 
Kingdom with the Financial Services Authority, where a single 
comprehensive supervisor is responsible for all the sectors of financial 
services business.172 
The United States financial regulatory system has been 
characterized as an “institutionally based functional system” with 
 
 171. Edmund L. Andrews & Eric Dash, U.S. Seeks Expanded Power in Seizing Firms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at A1. 
 172. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE (Mar. 2008) [hereinafter U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BLUEPRINT], 
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf; GROUP OF THIRTY, 
FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY (Jan. 2009), available at 
http://www.group30.org/pubs/reformreport.pdf. 
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separate regulatory agencies broadly responsible for regulatory 
oversight across functional lines, such as banking, insurance, 
securities and futures.173 Historically, these functions may have been 
housed in separate institutions, but with the passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act and other market developments, these functions are 
increasingly housed in a variety of institutions and within single 
institutions. The tension for financial regulatory reform in the 
United States is between making fundamental changes to this 
regulatory model, and making changes within the regulatory model 
as it currently exists. 
3. Obama Administration’s financial regulatory reform plan 
In June 2009, contemporaneously with increasingly loud calls for 
regulatory reform and domestic and international pressure to address 
some of the causes of the financial crisis, the U.S. Treasury released 
its White Paper on Financial Regulatory Reform.174 In addition to 
identifying specific areas for reform, the White Paper identified five 
key objectives for financial regulation: (1) to protect consumers and 
investors from financial abuse; (2) to promote robust supervision and 
regulation of financial firms; (3) to establish comprehensive 
regulation of financial markets; (4) to provide the government with 
the tools it needs to manage financial crises; and (5) to raise 
international regulatory standards and improve international 
cooperation.  
The extent to which the White Paper’s conceptual proposals, and 
subsequent legislation proposed by the Obama Administration to 
implement those proposals,175 achieve these goals is a matter of 
considerable debate. Roughly speaking, the proposals can be placed 
 
 173. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BLUEPRINT, supra note 172.  
 174. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL 
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (June 2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/ 
docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. For a memorandum analyzing the White Paper, see DAVIS 
POLK, A NEW FOUNDATION FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION? (June 2009), available at 
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/726890c9-123c-4113-a924-a129bc96fbce/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d1bbea9e-1369-49a5-838f-c83e8f4fae1b/062209_ 
New_Foundation.pdf. 
 175. For a discussion of the Obama Administration’s initial financial regulatory proposals, 
see DAVIS POLK, THE REGULATORY REFORM MARATHON (July 2009), available at 
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/963cb101-2593-4ba0-9133-02f73afd2bd9/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bfcca243-1cf2-47b6-81fb-0a23756a927c/072809_ 
Marathon.pdf. 
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into four categories: (1) supervision and regulation of financial firms; 
(2) comprehensive regulation of financial markets; (3) consumer and 
investor protection; and (4) executive compensation and corporate 
governance. I will provide an overview of these proposals below. For 
a timeline of the political and regulatory responses, see Annex B.176 
 a. Supervision and regulation of financial firms. Reform to the 
supervision and regulation of financial firms is a keystone of the 
Obama Administration’s proposals for comprehensive financial 
regulatory reform. These proposals include appointing the Federal 
Reserve as the systemic risk regulator in the United States, 
supplemented by a Council of Regulators; regulating systemically 
important financial institutions, or so-called “Tier 1 FHCs”; 
enhancing the capital and prudential standards for existing bank 
holding companies, and bringing previously exempted bank holding 
companies under the Federal Reserve’s supervision; providing for 
authority to resolve systemically significant financial institutions; 
regulating hedge funds; reforming the regulation of credit agencies; 
and creating an Office of National Insurance. 
 (1) Systemic risk regulator. Reflecting the consensus among 
most U.S. policymakers that the U.S. financial regulatory 
architecture needs a systemic regulator, the centerpiece of the U.S. 
Treasury’s proposal involves the creation of a single independent 
regulator with responsibility over systemically important firms and 
critical payment and settlement systems.177 
One of the key policy disagreements in the domestic debate 
revolves around the role of the Federal Reserve as the sole or lead 
systemic risk regulator. The Administration’s proposal reflects its 
decision to make the Federal Reserve solely responsible and 
accountable for systemic risk regulation and supervision, with 
assistance from a Financial Services Oversight Council. Many 
commentators and policy makers have long thought that the Federal 
Reserve is the only institution that has the experience and capacity to 
be the systemic risk regulator. The Bush Administration’s Treasury 
took this position in its Blueprint for a Modernized Financial 
Regulatory Structure, stating that “[t]he Federal Reserve should 
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assume this role in the optimal framework given its traditional central 
bank role of promoting overall macroeconomic stability.”178 
This aspect of the proposed legislation has had many critics, 
including U.S. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher 
Dodd, FDIC Chairman Bair, and SEC Chairman Schapiro. Some of 
these critics expressed concern about concentrating too much power 
in the hands of the Federal Reserve and reducing the influence of 
other federal agencies such as the FDIC and the SEC.179 Many of 
these critics would place systemic risk authority in the hands of a 
council made up of a variety of federal regulators, including the SEC 
and the FDIC. The House Republicans would go a step further and 
transfer the Federal Reserve’s current regulatory authority to a new 
single financial institutions regulator, while limiting the Federal 
Reserve’s mission to monetary policy. 
Recently, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, 
acknowledging these critics and their political clout, has stated that, 
although for purposes of both effectiveness and accountability, the 
consolidated supervision of an individual firm, whether or not it is 
systemically important, is best vested with a single agency, the 
broader task of monitoring and addressing systemic risks that might 
arise from the interaction of different types of financial institutions 
and markets should be incorporated into the mandate of each 
individual agency and should be the mandate of an oversight council, 
composed of representatives of the agencies and departments 
involved in the oversight of the financial sector.180 
How this debate over the systemic risk regulator will be resolved 
is yet to be determined, but it is clear that the Administration 
intends to push for the Federal Reserve to be the regulator of 
systemically important financial firms. 
 (2) Tier 1 FHCs. The regulation and consolidated 
supervision of systemically important financial institutions is another 
key element of the Obama Administration’s regulatory reform 
proposals. The current financial crisis demonstrated that banks and 
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bank holding companies are not the only financial institutions that 
can create systemic risk if they fail. Other financial firms—such as 
investment banks or insurance companies—can also create systemic 
risk if they fail. Yet these other financial institutions have not been 
subject to the same sort of regulation and consolidated supervision in 
the United States as banks and bank holding companies. To close 
this gap in the regulatory structure, the Administration has proposed 
subjecting all systemically important financial institutions to the same 
framework for consolidated prudential supervision that currently 
applies to bank holding companies. Such action would prevent 
financial firms that do not own a bank, but that nonetheless pose 
risks to the overall financial system because of the size, risks, or 
interconnectedness of their financial activities, from avoiding 
comprehensive supervisory oversight. 
The Administration’s legislative proposal would define a new 
category of financial institutions called “Tier 1 FHCs.” A Tier 1 
FHC would be any “United States financial company” or “foreign 
financial company” that is designated as a Tier 1 FHC by the Federal 
Reserve. A “United States financial company” would be a “bank 
holding company or any other company” organized under U.S. law 
that is engaged “in whole, or in part, directly or indirectly,” in 
“activities in the United States that are financial in nature,” 
regardless of whether the company owns or controls a bank.181 A 
“foreign financial company” would be a “bank holding company or 
any other company” organized under non-U.S. law that is engaged 
in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, including through a U.S. 
branch, in “activities in the United States that are financial in 
nature.”182 These definitions would give the Federal Reserve broad 
discretion to designate almost any large, highly leveraged or 
interconnected company as a Tier 1 FHC, provided it is engaged in 
at least some financial activities. Only a company that is exclusively 
engaged in nonfinancial activities is entirely insulated from being 
designated as a Tier 1 FHC. The proposed legislation would 
establish standards that are more stringent than those applicable to 
bank holding companies and would include stricter risk-based capital 
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requirements, leverage limits, liquidity requirements, and overall risk 
management requirements.183 
Critics have argued that designating firms as systemically 
important, or “Tier 1 FHCs,” will institutionalize them as “too big 
to fail,” creating another class of institutions like Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae that have funding advantages over their competitors 
because of the implicit support of the U.S. government. The 
Administration has responded by arguing that any funding 
advantages will be offset by the costs of enhanced capital, liquidity 
and other requirements that will be imposed on Tier 1 FHCs, and 
that it is not possible to impose these enhanced requirements on 
systemically important institutions unless there is some mechanism 
for identifying who they are. Moreover, the Administration has 
argued that imposing the enhanced requirements will reduce the 
incentives to becoming too large. Finally, the creation of an orderly 
resolution mechanism for these large, non-bank holding companies 
would also address the “too big to fail” problem.184 
 (3) Capital and prudential standards for BHCs. In addition 
to subjecting systemically important financial institutions to 
consolidated supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve, 
regardless of their charter, the Administration has proposed 
consolidating certain U.S. bank supervisors, eliminating the ability of 
certain “non-bank” bank holding companies to remain exempt from 
bank holding company regulation, and enhancing the capital and 
prudential standards applicable to all bank holding companies.  
As noted at the outset, one of the perceived flaws of the U.S. 
financial regulatory system is the number of regulators with similar 
mandates and exceptions to regulation due to historical 
circumstance. In an effort to address some of that inefficiency, the 
Administration has proposed consolidating the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, which oversees national banks, and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision, which oversees national savings 
associations, into a single regulator, the National Bank Supervisor.185  
In addition, certain insured depository institutions that do not 
currently fall within the definition of the term “bank” for the 
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purpose of bank holding company regulation, such as savings 
associations, industrial loan companies, credit card banks, trust 
companies, and grandfathered non-bank banks, would be included 
with a new definition of the term “bank.” Their parent holding 
companies would therefore become bank holding companies and 
would be required to conform their activities to the non-banking 
activity restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act or to divest 
control over such depository institution subsidiaries.186 With these 
reforms, the Administration is attempting to move financial 
regulation closer to a rational, more streamlined system. 
The Administration has also focused on enhancing capital and 
prudential standards for all bank holding companies. A U.S. Treasury 
working group will publish a report on capital requirements by 
December 31, 2009. This is occurring in the context of a review by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of capital 
requirements. The Basel Committee released a complete proposal by 
the end of 2009.187 The U.S. Treasury has called for reaching an 
international agreement on a new global capital framework by 
December 31, 2010, with implementation by December 31, 
2012.188  
Some of the U.S. capital reform proposals include making 
common equity a large majority of a banking firm’s Tier 1 capital, 
and limiting the amount of cumulative or non-cumulative perpetual 
preferred stock and qualifying trust preferred securities that can be 
included in Tier 1 capital. In addition, higher risk-based capital 
charges for certain instruments and exposures, such as off-balance 
sheet vehicles, proprietary and other trading positions, equity 
investments, asset-backed securities and mortgage-backed securities, 
and counterparty credit risk exposures to financial firms (e.g., non-
centrally cleared derivatives, repos, reverse repos, securities lending, 
and margin loans), could be proposed. Other proposals are to apply 
higher capital requirements in the early phases of the credit cycle, to 
apply more uniform capital requirements throughout the cycle, and 
to require forward-looking loan loss reserves. U.S. bank regulators 
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and Treasury are debating whether to impose a capital surcharge on 
systemically important firms. Specific quantitative proposals for these 
charges and requirements have yet to be announced.  
 (4) Resolution of systemically important financial institutions. 
One of the deficiencies identified in the recent financial crisis was the 
lack of authority by any federal regulatory agency to resolve a 
systemically important financial institution, such as Lehman Brothers 
or AIG, other than to allow the institution to file for bankruptcy. 
Those who view this lack of authority as a deficiency believe that 
allowing a systemically important financial institution to file for 
bankruptcy can result in systemic risk to the financial system. They 
believe that a regime that empowers a federal agency to direct the 
orderly resolution of failing, systemically important financial firms 
would be an improvement.  
The proposed resolution authority is modeled on the special 
resolution law used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to 
resolve insured banks and thrifts. Its proponents believe that it would 
provide the government with a mechanism for imposing losses on 
the shareholders and creditors of the firm. For example, Chairman 
Bernanke has stated that establishing a credible process for imposing 
such losses is essential to restoring a meaningful degree of market 
discipline and addressing the too-big-to-fail problem. The availability 
of a workable resolution regime would also replace the need for the 
Federal Reserve to use its emergency lending authority under section 
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to prevent the failure of specific 
institutions. 
Currently, the proposal would place the FDIC or, in certain 
circumstances, the SEC, in charge of the resolution process. 
Potentially covered companies include any Tier 1 FHC, any bank 
holding company and any of their subsidiaries (other than an insured 
depository institution subsidiary, a broker-dealer subsidiary that is a 
member of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), 
or an insurance company subsidiary). These other subsidiaries would 
be resolved under their existing insolvency regimes.189 Thus, while 
the proposed authority would have authorized a federal agency to 
resolve the holding companies and many of the subsidiaries in the 
Lehman Brothers or AIG groups, it would not have included the 
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authority over those entire groups because the flagship broker-dealer 
in the Lehman Brothers group and every insurance subsidiary in the 
AIG group (accounting for the vast majority of the group’s assets 
and liabilities) would have been excluded from coverage. 
Moreover, there are significant issues raised by this proposal. The 
proposal would change the “rules of the game” for creditors and 
counterparties on the eve of bankruptcy and thereby disrupt their 
reasonable expectations with little or no prior notice. Creditors, 
counterparties, customers, and other stakeholders have very different 
rights under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act, and changing the rules of the game on the eve of 
bankruptcy could itself create systemic risk. This problem may be 
addressed by harmonizing the rules that define creditors’ rights in 
the proposed resolution authority with their counterparts under the 
Bankruptcy Code. This would leave a federal agency in charge of the 
process with the conservatorship and bridge company options, but 
otherwise applying many of the substantive rules defining creditors’ 
rights as they currently exist in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
 (5) Hedge funds. For a variety of reasons, the regulation of 
hedge funds and hedge fund advisers has become a main target of 
regulatory reform. Although hedge funds are not widely thought to 
have been a cause of the current financial crisis, the lack of 
transparency into their operations and their capacity to cause 
systemic risk, as demonstrated by the losses incurred by Long Term 
Capital Management in the late 1990s, has drawn scrutiny and 
persistent calls from Congress, foreign supervisors, and the public to 
require hedge fund advisers to register.190 Moreover, hedge funds 
have become direct competitors with banks and securities firms in 
many aspects of their businesses. 
The Administration has proposed to amend the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 to require nearly all advisers to hedge funds 
and other private pools of capital to register with the SEC.191 The 
proposed legislation would not require funds themselves to register, 
but would require advisers to private funds to report to the SEC, on 
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a confidential basis, information about the funds they advise to 
permit an assessment of systemic risk posed by the funds. 
The proposal would eliminate the exemption for private 
investment advisers and require all advisers to “private funds” to 
register with the SEC if their assets under management exceed $30 
million. The definition of “private fund” does not distinguish 
between hedge funds and other private funds, such as venture capital 
and private equity funds. The proposal does create a new exemption 
for a “foreign private adviser.” The proposal would require that an 
offshore adviser have no place of business in the United States in 
order to qualify for the exemption. Furthermore, the exemption 
would require not only that the foreign adviser’s U.S. clients number 
less than fifteen but also that the adviser manage less than $25 
million attributable to U.S. clients. 
Registered investment advisers that are subject to the Advisers 
Act are required to implement a comprehensive compliance 
program, adopt a code of ethics and an insider trading policy, 
comply with certain custody procedures, advertising restrictions and 
document retention obligations, disclose and report specified 
information on Form ADV, and be subject to SEC examinations. 
The proposed legislation would authorize the SEC to require 
registered investment advisers to provide reports regarding private 
funds they advise “as are necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest and for the assessment of systemic risk”192 and to provide 
such reports to the Federal Reserve as well as to the Financial 
Services Oversight Council. The Administration has stated that 
during the financial crisis the government lacked the data necessary 
to monitor private fund activity, and that the proposal would require 
advisers to private funds to report information necessary to assess 
“whether risks in the aggregate or risks in any particular fund pose a 
threat to our overall financial stability.”193 The reports required by 
the proposed legislation would include assets under management, 
use of leverage (including off-balance sheet leverage), counterparty 
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credit risk exposure, trading and investment positions, trading 
practices, and other information as determined by the SEC.194  
Representative Paul E. Kanjorski, Chairman of the House 
Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises, recently proposed legislation to 
amend the Advisers Act similar to the Administration’s proposed 
legislation, except that it would exempt investment advisers to 
venture capital funds from registration requirements and enhance the 
SEC’s rulemaking authority in this area.195 House Financial Services 
Committee Chairman Barney Frank has said that he plans to 
introduce legislation imposing restrictions on hedge funds, private 
equity firms, and broker-dealers while exempting venture capital 
firms from additional regulations as well.196 
 (6) Credit rating agencies. Among the many weaknesses 
identified as contributing to the financial crisis was the conduct of 
credit rating agencies, which were blamed for not adequately or 
accurately identifying credit risk in their securities ratings. Regulatory 
initiatives are currently under way to improve the integrity of the 
rating agencies’ rating process. These initiatives have focused on 
enhancing the transparency of the rating process through greater 
disclosure of rating agencies’ procedures and methodologies and 
strengthening rules addressing conflicts of interest.  
On July 14, 2009, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro announced a plan 
to create a new entity within the SEC whose sole purpose is to 
oversee and examine credit-rating agencies. On September 17, 
2009, the SEC held an open meeting on measures to strengthen 
the oversight of credit rating agencies. At the meeting, the SEC 
voted unanimously to take several rulemaking actions, including 
the adoption of amendments designed to reduce reliance on credit 
ratings by eliminating references to nationally recognized statistical 
rating organization (NRSRO) ratings from certain SEC rules and 
 
 194. DAVIS POLK, supra note 191. 
 195. See Davis Polk, Representative Kanjorski Releases Investor Protection, Private 
Investment Fund Advisers Registration and Federal Insurance Office Proposals, Oct. 6, 2009, 
http://intranet.dpw.com/intranet/SS/depts/busdev/Communications%20by%20Type/All%
20Client%20Communications/2009/100609_Kanjorski.pdf.  
 196. See Frank to Propose Hedge-fund Regulation Bill, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 1, 2009, 
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/frank-to-propose-hedge-fund-regulation-
bill-2009-10-01. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/26/2010 8:05 PM 
421 The Global Financial Crisis 
 473 
forms.197 Also adopted were rules to provide investors with greater 
information concerning ratings history and to promote unsolicited 
ratings by providing all NRSROs with equal access to data 
underlying structured finance products. The SEC also proposed 
rules that would enhance credit rating agencies’ compliance 
programs, further eliminate references to NRSRO ratings from 
SEC rules and forms, and require additional disclosure about the 
meaningfulness of ratings and the potential existence of revenue-
related conflicts of interest. In addition, legislation proposed by the 
U.S. Treasury would require registration of all credit rating 
agencies as NRSROs, further enhance the SEC’s supervision of 
credit rating agencies, and impose investor protection 
requirements. However, critics have been vocal in their assertions 
that the current initiatives do not go far enough. They have 
suggested further-reaching initiatives, such as requiring rating 
agencies to perform their own due diligence to verify information 
presented to them by issuers and exposing rating agencies to 
meaningful legal liability risks. The SEC has actively engaged such 
critics and recently voted to issue a concept release considering 
whether to subject NRSROs to liability when their ratings are used 
in connection with a registered offering.198 
 (7) Office of national insurance. Many regulators and 
commentators have endorsed the concept of a national insurance 
regulator, noting that “[j]ust as the state/federal banking system 
works well for the industry and the economy—so too can a similar 
insurance system.”199 In congressional testimony, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner has said that “there is a good case for 
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introducing an optional federal charter for insurance companies.”200 
However, due to political and historical roadblocks, it has been very 
difficult to move away from the current system of fifty-state 
regulation or to supplement it with an optional federal insurance 
charter. 
As a compromise, the Administration has proposed an Office of 
National Insurance within the U.S. Treasury which, while not an 
optional federal regulator, would have real, albeit limited, powers 
and could portend increased federal involvement in the insurance 
industry.201 The Office of National Insurance would monitor all 
aspects of the insurance industry, including identifying regulatory 
issues or gaps in the regulation of insurers that could contribute to a 
systemic crisis in the insurance industry or the U.S. financial system. 
It could recommend to the Federal Reserve that it designate an 
insurer, including its affiliates, as a Tier 1 FHC. The scope of the 
Office of National Insurance’s powers would extend to all lines of 
insurance except health insurance. In order to serve its functions, it 
would be given authority, with subpoena powers, to collect 
information from insurers (of a threshold size) and their affiliates, in 
coordination with the applicable state regulator (or regulatory 
agency). 
It would also provide a much needed voice on international 
issues. The Office of National Insurance would coordinate federal 
efforts and establish federal policy on prudential aspects of 
international insurance matters. The proposal provides the U.S. 
Treasury Secretary with the explicit authority to negotiate and enter 
into international insurance agreements on prudential measures. 
Currently, representatives from fifty-six U.S. jurisdictions as well as 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners participate in 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors activities, which 
can complicate the development of a uniform U.S. perspective on 
insurance matters. 
 b. Comprehensive regulation of financial markets. The 
comprehensive regulation of financial markets is a key element of the 
Administration’s regulatory reform agenda. The perception that 
over-the-counter derivatives and credit default swaps were 
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inadequately regulated and contributed to the accumulation of 
systemic risk has led to calls for reform in those areas. Moreover, 
inadequate oversight and supervision of the securitization market was 
another area perceived to have contributed to excessive levels of debt 
leverage which exacerbated the housing bubble. 
 (1) No SEC-CFTC merger; regulation of OTC derivatives. 
One of the obvious areas for financial regulatory reform would have 
been to merge the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission with 
the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. However, the 
political realities make this logical rationalization impossible to 
achieve. As a result, and in response to public pressure, the SEC and 
the CFTC have focused on how to harmonize futures and securities 
regulation. The Chairmen of the SEC and the CFTC have recently 
announced that the two agencies expect to issue a report by October 
15, 2009, that will address the key areas in which their regulatory 
schemes are different, and recommend legislative and regulatory 
actions to address those differences where appropriate.202 
In addition, the Administration has proposed sweeping 
legislation that for the first time would subject the over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives markets, OTC derivatives dealers, derivatives-
clearing organizations and agencies, swap repositories, and major 
non-dealer participants to comprehensive regulation.203 The 
proposed legislation will have major consequences for the OTC 
derivatives markets, dealers and participants, as well as for the CFTC 
and SEC. It represents a significant policy reversal from the 
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, legislation that 
essentially shielded the OTC derivatives market from pervasive 
regulation. 
Remarkably, given concerns over regulatory fragmentation, the 
proposed legislation would divide primary regulatory and supervisory 
authority for derivatives among the CFTC, SEC and, in some 
instances, federal bank regulators. The CFTC and SEC would jointly 
adopt most rules implementing the proposed legislation and, in 
some cases, would be required to do so in consultation with federal 
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bank regulators. The proposed legislation would also require that 
“standardized” OTC derivatives be cleared by a derivatives clearing 
organization regulated by the CFTC or a securities clearing agency 
regulated by the SEC, and that all OTC derivatives that are centrally 
cleared be traded on a CFTC- or SEC-regulated exchange or a 
regulated alternative swap execution facility. 
The proposed legislation would establish regimes for the 
registration and regulation by the CFTC and the SEC of a wide array 
of new entities, including derivatives dealers and major derivatives 
participants, swap repositories, security-based swap repositories, 
clearing organizations and agencies, and alternative swap execution 
facilities (under both the Commodity Exchange Act and the 
Exchange Act), and would also expand considerably the 
requirements applicable to CFTC-regulated derivatives clearing 
organizations. 
The CFTC and SEC would share certain aspects of regulatory 
authority with the federal bank regulators who would have 
prudential oversight over derivatives dealers and major derivatives 
participants that are banks, and branches or agencies of foreign 
banks, and, for purposes of setting capital requirements, bank 
holding companies. In most cases, rulemaking and interpretations 
would be jointly promulgated by both the CFTC and SEC, and the 
federal bank regulators would have rulemaking authority with 
respect to margin, capital, and prudential rules with respect to the 
entities they regulate. 
Importantly, regulators would be required to impose and enforce 
higher capital requirements for OTC derivatives that are not centrally 
cleared. The proposed legislation would permit, but not require, 
federal bank regulators to prescribe margin requirements for certain 
hedging counterparties that are not predominantly engaged in 
financial activities and are not derivatives dealers or major derivatives 
participants. The capital and margin requirements set by the federal 
bank regulators would serve as a floor for capital and margin 
requirements set by the CFTC and SEC and for capital requirements 
set by the Federal Reserve for bank holding companies and Tier 1 
FHCs. The CFTC and SEC would be required to set capital and 
margin requirements for non-bank derivatives dealers and non-bank 
major derivatives participants that are “as strict or stricter” than 
those set by federal bank regulators for derivatives dealers and major 
derivatives participants that are banks. Harmonization of CFTC and 
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SEC regulations is sought by requiring the two agencies to prescribe 
requirements that treat “functionally or economically similar 
products” similarly. 
On October 2, 2009, House Financial Services Committee 
Chairman Barney Frank released a discussion draft for OTC 
derivatives reform. The draft bill builds on the Administration’s 
proposed legislation, adding regulation in some areas and softening a 
number of key provisions, most importantly the clearing and 
exchange trading requirements and exclusions for end users.204 
 (2) Systemically important payment, clearing, and settlement 
systems. Payment, clearing, and settlement systems may be the least 
romantic portion of the U.S. financial system. Yet it is hard to 
imagine any segment of the U.S. financial system that has the 
potential to be more systemically important. If any major operator of 
one of these systems failed or experienced a serious disruption, 
financial transactions around the country and the globe could grind 
to a halt. 
One way to measure their systemic importance is to consider the 
mindboggling volumes of transactions that the operators of some of 
these systems process. According to data posted on the Federal 
Reserve’s Web site, the average volume of dollar transfers processed 
by the Fedwire Funds Transfer System was approximately $3 trillion 
per day in 2008.205 Assuming 250 business days per year, that 
translates into $750 trillion per year. Yet only a fraction of the dollar 
payments made through the U.S. and international banking systems 
are processed through Fedwire. A substantial and largely 
unmeasurable volume of additional transactions is processed on the 
books of banks themselves or directly between correspondent banks, 
without going through Fedwire. 
The securities settlement system processes similar volumes of 
securities transactions. According to data posted on the Federal 
Reserve’s Web site, the average volume of U.S. government and 
agency securities transactions processed by the Fedwire Securities 
 
 204. For a comparison of the Administration’s proposed legislation and Rep. Frank’s 
draft bill, and a discussion of the main differences between the proposals, see Davis Polk, 
Representative Frank Releases Discussion Draft for Over-the-Counter Derivatives Reform,  
Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/a68e3628-9fa6-4c1d-9b92-
0f71dfc754d8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5a6ee725-a3b8-4588-b63e-1108df071 
367/100609_frank_deriv.pdf. 
 205. Federal Reserve, Fedwire Funds Service—Annual Data, http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/paymentsystems/files/fedfunds_ann.txt (last visited April 2, 2010). 
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Service was $1.6 trillion per day or $419 trillion per year in 2008.206 
Similarly, the Depository Trust Company, the principal U.S. 
securities settlement system for U.S. corporate securities, reported 
processing $455 trillion of securities transactions in 2008.207 A 
substantial, and largely unmeasurable, volume of additional 
transactions is processed on the books of banks, brokers, and other 
securities intermediaries, or directly between securities 
intermediaries, without going through Fedwire or DTC. 
International securities settlement systems, mainly Euroclear and 
Clearstream, also process foreign and international securities 
transactions for U.S. and non-U.S. investors. Euroclear, the largest 
settlement system for internationally traded securities, reported a 
processing volume of €560 trillion in 2008, including transactions 
for U.S. investors.208 In light of the systemic importance of payment, 
clearing, and settlement systems, it is not surprising that the 
Administration has proposed that the Federal Reserve should have 
additional authority over these institutions as part of its overhaul of 
the regulation of systemically important financial companies. 
The Administration’s proposed legislation would principally give 
the Federal Reserve authority to set risk management standards for 
both systemically important financial market utilities and the conduct 
of systemically important payment, clearing, and settlement activities 
by any financial institution.209 Most financial institutions conduct 
some form of payment, clearing, or settlement function for their 
customers, including street name settlement, wire transfers, clearing 
bank operations, and tri-party repurchase facilities. In addition, some 
of these institutions conduct these activities on a “multilateral” basis. 
Any bank, broker, insurance company, or other financial institution 
that is not otherwise systemically important could have its payment, 
clearing, and settlement business subject to the Federal Reserve risk 
management oversight if the business is found to be systemically 
 
 206. Federal Reserve, Fedwire Securities Service—Annual Data, http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedsecs_ann.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2010).  
 207. The Depository Trust Company Web site, http://www.dtcc.com/about/subs/ 
dtc.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2010). 
 208. Press Release, Euroclear, Nordic CSD to Join the Euroclear Group—CSD 
Consolidation Accelerates (June 2, 2008), http://www.euroclear.eu/3027_ENG_ST.htm.   
 209. Davis Polk, Obama Administration Proposes Sweeping Legislation to Regulate Over-
the-Counter Derivatives (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/ 
5a453323-3f01-4885-aede-07938800eedd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f08f8b6e-3 
5a8-4ad8-88e4-8b9c697e5672/08.17.09.Obama.Derivatives.html. 
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important. This would provide the “strong and consistent prudential 
standards and supervisory oversight” that Chairman Bernanke has 
recently reiterated are needed.210 
Moreover, the proposed legislation authorizes the Federal 
Reserve to open and maintain an account for a designated financial 
market utility and offer the designated financial market utility the 
same financial services, discount window, and borrowing privileges as 
the Federal Reserve may provide to a depository institution under 
the Federal Reserve Act. This means that designated financial market 
utilities would have access to central bank money, making it feasible 
for them to settle delivery-versus-payment transactions in U.S. 
dollars on their own books without going through intermediary 
banks. They would also be able to tap the Federal Reserve as a lender 
of last resort, should they have liquidity issues. 
 (3) Securitization markets. The regulation of the U.S. 
securitization markets is another alleged weakness that contributed 
to the financial crisis. In a typical securitization, loan originators 
extend credit to borrowers and sell the income stream from that loan 
to a securitizer, who packages it along with many similar loans in a 
special purpose vehicle. Slices of the special purpose vehicle’s income 
stream are sold to investors as asset-backed securities. Securitization 
technology is meant to spread risk; instead of trapping capital at the 
lender level by requiring a lender to hold all of the credit risk of a 
loan until its maturity, securitization allows a lender to sell the loan 
immediately and use the funds received to originate new loans. 
Securitization has led to an enormous increase in the availability of 
credit financing for businesses and individuals over the past two 
decades and, as such, has been a major engine of economic growth. 
However, a loan originator’s ability to avoid the credit risk of 
individual borrowers through securitization can also reduce the 
originator’s incentive to make sure borrowers are likely to be able to 
repay. In the extreme, if a lender retains no risk and is compensated 
for making loans regardless of repayment by the borrower, there may 
be a weakened incentive for the lender to determine the 
creditworthiness of the borrower. Allegations that some originators 
in the subprime mortgage market engaged in poor underwriting 
(through so-called “no-doc” loans, for example) led the 
 
 210. Ben S. Bernanke, Fed. Reserve Chairman, Remarks on Regulatory Reform Before 
the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 1, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20091001a.htm. 
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Administration to propose requiring originators and securitizers of 
loans to retain some of the risk in the loans they sell as part of the 
securitization chain. 
The Administration proposes to take a two-pronged approach to 
the reform of the securitization markets. First, the Administration’s 
proposed legislation aims to strengthen underwriting standards by 
requiring originators and securitizers to retain some of the risk of the 
loans they extend or package as part of an asset-backed securities 
securitization chain. These “skin-in-the-game” provisions would 
reduce the incentives for originators and securitizers to fund loans 
regardless of the borrower’s ability to pay, as is alleged to have 
occurred frequently in the subprime mortgage market. The proposed 
legislation instructs the SEC and the federal banking agencies (the 
Federal Reserve, the National Bank Supervisor, and the FDIC) to 
enact regulations requiring securitizers to keep 5% of the risk of loans 
packaged in securitization transactions. Second, the proposed 
legislation aims to make the asset-backed securities investment 
process itself more transparent through a combination of disclosure 
by asset-backed securities issuers and improved information 
dissemination by credit rating agencies. 
 c. Consumer financial protection agency. A number of regulators 
and politicians have taken up the call for consumer protection, 
arguing that unfair and deceptive practices contributed to instability 
in the financial markets and the downturn in the economy by luring 
consumers into mortgages and products that were not appropriate 
for their circumstances.  
The Administration has proposed creating a Consumer Financial 
Protection Agency, whose mission would be “to promote 
transparency, simplicity, fairness, accountability, and access in the 
market for consumer financial products or services.”211 However, the 
agency would be vested with vast new powers delineated in such a 
way that future jurisdictional turf wars are inevitable.212 
The proposed legislation would authorize the agency to regulate 
“consumer financial products or services,” defined as “any financial 
product or service to be used by a consumer primarily for personal, 
 
 211. Davis Polk, Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, July 1, 2009, 
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/2c9ef9b3-6871-4eac-9498-49d5fde025c7/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/32be2bc8-4cd3-4673-b1b8-0308ab5100b3/070109_ 
CFPAA.html (citation omitted). 
 212. Id. 
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family or household purposes.”213 The legislation would provide the 
new agency with broad authority to issue rules to ensure consumer 
protection. This authority would include prescribing rules regarding 
disclosures, sales practices, minimum operational standards, and 
requirements to offer standard products and services. For example, 
the new agency would be authorized to prohibit pre-dispute 
arbitration, propose model mortgage loan disclosure language, and 
require disclosure allowing consumers to compare financial products 
or services. 
The proposed legislation would grant the agency broad authority 
to collect information, conduct investigations, and bring 
enforcement proceedings. The agency would also be empowered to 
require written reports from regulated entities to ensure compliance 
with consumer protection laws and rules adopted pursuant to the 
proposed legislation. The agency would also be authorized to issue 
subpoenas for the production of documents and testimony and to 
issue civil investigative demands for the production of documents, 
written reports or answers to questions, and oral testimony. 
Throughout the proposed legislation, the role of state law 
enforcement with respect to consumer financial products is featured 
as a recurring theme. The proposed legislation contemplates that 
federal standards would act as a floor, not a ceiling, and explicitly 
encourages states to enact stricter laws. The legislation provides that 
any state consumer law of general application would apply to 
national banks and that state attorneys general would be authorized 
to bring actions in federal courts to enforce federal laws. This could 
lead to a fifty-state regulatory regime which would complicate, not 
streamline, consumer financial regulation. 
 d. Executive compensation and corporate governance. Among the 
topics that have received widespread attention in the United States 
and abroad is executive compensation and corporate governance 
reform. Outrage over the size of executive pay and concern about 
the short-term risk-taking incentives created by pay structures have 
propelled these issues to the forefront of the public debate. The 
Administration has proposed draft legislation to address executive 
compensation and corporate governance issues. 
The proposed new legislation would require all U.S. public 
companies to grant shareholders an annual non-binding vote on 
 
 213. Id. 
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executive compensation packages (say-on-pay) and further regulate 
compensation committees.214 
If enacted, shareholders will be asked to cast non-binding votes 
to approve executive compensation as disclosed in proxy statements. 
Shareholders will also be asked to separately approve golden 
parachute payments in the context of meetings involving an 
acquisition, merger, or sale of assets. This vote would also be non-
binding.  
According to the Administration, the purpose of the legislation is 
to encourage accountability and better disclosure. The U.S. Treasury 
pointed to the experience in the United Kingdom where say-on-pay 
was adopted in 2002, noting that the rules have promoted increased 
shareholder dialogue and improved compensation practices, 
including the hiring of independent consultants, detailed 
compensation guidelines, and an increase in the number of meetings 
of compensation panels.  
Under the proposal, compensation committee members would 
be subject to the same additional independence standards as audit 
committee members, and compensation consultants, legal counsel, 
and other advisors to the compensation committee would have to 
meet independence standards promulgated by the SEC. 
Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee Barney 
Frank has also distributed a draft of executive compensation and 
corporate governance legislation that is similar to the 
Administration’s proposals on say-on-pay and compensation 
committee matters. It would require financial institutions to disclose 
the structure of incentive-based compensation arrangements 
applicable to all employees to their federal regulator. Financial 
institutions would include banks, bank holding companies, broker-
dealers, credit unions, and investment advisers and any other 
institution identified by federal financial regulators. Such disclosure 
would need to be sufficient for federal regulators to determine 
whether the compensation structure is aligned with sound risk 
management, structured to account for the time horizon of risks, 
and meets any other criteria that the regulators may determine to be 
appropriate. 
 
 214. Davis Polk, Treasury Seeks Legislation to Enact Say on Pay and Compensation 
Committees Changes for All U.S. Public Companies, July 20, 2009, http://www.davispolk. 
com/files/Publication/dccc1c9e-91c7-40db-b2ed-05ba2330b43b/Presentation/Publication 
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The House proposal would also grant federal regulators the 
authority to proscribe inappropriate or imprudent compensation 
practices for financial institutions as part of their solvency regulation. 
Federal regulators would be required to enact regulations that 
prohibit any incentive payment arrangement or other feature that 
encourages inappropriate risks by financial institutions, that threaten 
the safety and soundness of financial institutions, or that could have 
a serious adverse effect on economic conditions or financial stability. 
Recently, the Federal Reserve has indicated that it will introduce 
guidelines to curb pay packages in banking. The Federal Reserve’s 
guidance to banks “will apply not only to the top five or ten 
executives but way down into the organization—to traders or 
anybody whose activities can affect the risk profile of the company,” 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told Congress, presenting 
it as a “safety-and-soundness” issue.215 Moreover, there have also 
been several executive compensation and corporate governance 
proposals coming out of the United Kingdom, the European Union, 
the G-20, and the Financial Stability Board. For a summary of these 
proposals, please see Annex D. 
B. U.K. Proposals 
The financial storm has prompted the United Kingdom to 
rethink its institutional framework for financial regulation. On July 8, 
2009, HM Treasury released a White Paper—Reforming Financial 
Markets—outlining its regulatory reform proposals.216 Under the 
proposals, the current institutional arrangements among the 
tripartite authorities—the Treasury, the Bank of England, and the 
FSA—would largely be left in place. About two weeks later, the 
opposition Conservative Party, now leading in polls for the next 
general election to be held by June 2010, released its 
counterproposals in an alternative White Paper—From Crisis to 
Confidence: Plan for Sound Banking.217 Under its proposals, the 
Conservative Party proposed a paradigm shift in the regulatory 
 
 215. See Paul Wiseman & Pallavi Gogoi, Fed Aims to Rein in Bank Pay Abuses Way Below 
Top Execs, USA TODAY, Oct. 6, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/ 
industries/banking/2009-10-06-fed-rules-bank-pay_N.htm?csp=34.  
 216. See HM TREASURY, supra note 142.  
 217. See U.K. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, FROM CRISIS TO CONFIDENCE: PLAN FOR SOUND 
BANKING (July 2009), available at http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/ 
2009/07/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/PlanforSoundBanking.ashx.  
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framework. If it wins the election, the Conservative Party intends to 
abolish the “integrated” approach to financial regulation, widely 
known as the “FSA model” that was put in place some twelve years 
ago by the U.K. government under the Labour Party, and move to a 
“twin peaks” structure. 
1. U.K. Labour government’s plan 
HM Treasury argues in its White Paper that the current 
institutional framework remains the right approach.218 As widely 
expected, HM Treasury’s White Paper endorsed all of the major 
findings and recommendations in the Turner Review: A Regulatory 
Response to the Global Banking Crisis, an internationally acclaimed 
study led by FSA Chairman Lord Adair Turner.219 To better 
coordinate among the tripartite authorities, it proposes to establish a 
Council for Financial Stability (CFS), a largely advisory body. To 
strengthen the macro-prudential oversight, both the FSA and the 
Bank of England would be statutorily responsible for financial 
stability. 
 a. The Turner Review. Since the publication of the Turner 
Review in March 2009, many of its recommendations have been 
endorsed by the G-20 summits, or recognized or adopted in the 
United States and the European Union. These recommendations, 
which are dealt with at length in relevant U.S., EU, or G-20 
regulatory reform proposals in this Article and thus will not be 
repeated here, cover capital and liquidity requirements, macro-
prudential oversight, regulation of systemically important 
institutions, crediting rating agencies, remuneration, risk 
management and corporate governance, market infrastructure for 
 
 218. Shortly after the publication of HM Treasury’s White Paper, the U.K. House of 
Commons’ Treasury Committee released a report that dismissed its proposed reforms to the 
institutional structure of the tripartite authorities as “largely cosmetic.” The Parliamentary 
Committee’s report stated that the lines of authorities remain a muddle: there is still a lack of 
clarity regarding who is responsible for systemic oversight and who has executive authority in 
times of crisis. The report pointed out that before the crisis hit, no one had formal 
responsibility for financial stability, but now many do, including the Bank of England, the 
Financial Stability Committee within the Bank, the FSA, and the proposed Council for 
Financial Stability. See HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMMITTEE, BANKING CRISIS: 
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 3–4 (July 31, 2009), available at http://www.publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/767/767.pdf.  
 219. See generally HM TREASURY, supra note 142; FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, 
supra note 37. 
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OTC derivatives, etc.220 What is worthy of more treatment here with 
regard to the situation in the United Kingdom is Lord Turner’s call 
for a more “intrusive” regulatory and supervisory approach by the 
FSA, a shift from its much discredited “light-touch” regulatory 
philosophy.221 In particular, the Turner Review recommends that the 
FSA should not just ensure systems and processes of the supervised 
institutions, but also challenge their business models and strategies. 
“This shift will imply a greater willingness . . . to intervene directly if 
[the FSA] perceive[s] that specific business strategies are creating 
undue risk to the bank itself or to the wider system.”222 It also 
recommends more intensive information requirements on certain key 
risks (e.g., liquidity), a focus on remuneration policies, and more 
regulatory scrutiny of technical skills of certain key management 
personnel.223 Despite its future being clouded in uncertainty, the 
FSA under the current leadership of Lord Turner has already 
substantially intensified its regulation of the City. 
 b. Revised “integrated” model. The FSA would continue to be the 
single regulator of all the financial services firms in the United 
Kingdom, responsible for both prudential regulation and consumer 
and investor protection. To strengthen coordination and 
cooperation among the tripartite authorities, HM Treasury proposes 
to establish a Council for Financial Stability (CFS).224 The FSA 
would be granted a new statutory remit for financial stability, 
importantly, with rule-making powers in furtherance of its new 
objective. 
 (1) Council for Financial Stability (CFS).225 The CFS would 
be created on a statutory basis to replace the current Standing 
Committee under a Memorandum of Understanding. The CFS 
would consist of the same tripartite authorities, chaired by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Similar to the Financial Services 
Oversight Council proposed by the Obama Administration, the CFS 
will mainly be an advisory body and a forum for discussion and 
coordination of regulatory actions among the tripartite authorities. 
The CFS will hold regular meetings throughout the year and, if 
 
 220. See generally FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, supra note 37.  
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necessary, hold emergency meetings to analyze and examine 
emerging systemic risks to the United Kingdom’s economy.  
 (2) The FSA.226 As the single prudential regulator of all 
financial services firms in the United Kingdom, the FSA has legal 
authority to set prudential standards, such as capital, liquidity, and 
risk management standards. HM Treasury proposes to legislate to 
provide the FSA with an explicit financial stability objective and 
extend its rule-making power, “to give it clearer legal authority to set 
rules whose purpose is to protect wider financial stability.”227 Under 
the proposals, the FSA would be granted more regulatory powers, 
including expanded powers to gather information from unregulated 
institutions to determine whether they should be brought under 
formal FSA supervision, enhanced enforcement powers to police 
market misconduct, and extended powers to intervene in individual 
institutions in pursuit of its new financial stability objective, etc. 
 (3) The Bank of England.228 The Banking Act 2009 (Banking 
Act), which became effective on February 21, 2009, has already 
provided the Bank of England “a clear statutory objective” for 
financial stability.229 HM Treasury acknowledges the responsibilities 
of the Bank of England to protect financial stability under existing 
legal authority, e.g., its role as lender of last resort and its oversight 
over key inter-bank payment systems. In particular, the Banking Act, 
which established a special resolution regime (SRR) for banks, 
granted the Bank of England the power to intervene to resolve 
failing banks once the FSA “triggers” an institution into the SRR.230 
2. Conservative Party’s plan: A “twin-peaks” structure 
Despite the differences with HM Treasury and the ruling Labour 
Party, the Conservative Party’s plan does not dispute most of the 
recommendations from the Turner Review.231 Instead, the 
Conservative Party proposes a drastic shift in the institutional 
framework for regulation. 
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Under the Conservative Party’s plan, the FSA and the tripartite 
system, instituted by the U.K. government while controlled by the 
Labour Party some twelve years ago, would be abolished. The FSA’s 
bank supervisory powers, which were transferred to it from the Bank 
of England, would be transferred back. The remnants of the FSA 
would be merged with the Office of Fair Trading that is in charge of 
the regulation of consumer credit, and the newly merged entity 
would be reconstituted to become “a powerful new Consumer 
Protection Agency” that would be “a far more consumer-oriented, 
transparent and focused body than the FSA.”232 While many bank 
regulators in the United States are questioning, and the industry 
representatives are lobbying hard against, the Obama 
Administration’s proposal to create a Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency, and the idea of separating consumer protection from 
prudential supervision, the U.K. Conservatives confirm in their 
proposals that they would demolish the FSA, and the “integrated” 
model along with it, if they win the election next year. 
“In the United States, they’ve called on the Federal Reserve,” 
said David Cameron, the Conservative Party’s leader, “In Britain, it’s 
time to call on the Bank of England.”233 Under the Conservative 
Party’s plan, the Bank of England would be “strong and powerful,” 
responsible for both macro-prudential regulation to ensure financial 
stability and micro-prudential regulation with oversight over all 
banks and other financial institutions, including insurance 
companies.234 Under the plan, a Financial Policy Committee would 
be created within the Bank, working alongside, and in “close 
coordination” with, the Monetary Policy Committee to monitor 
systemic risks and execute the special resolution regime for failing 
banks.235 Similar to the collective responsibility model of the 
Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee will 
have independent members with representation of external experts. 
A primary goal of this new structure is to “ensure that monetary 
policy, financial stability and the regulation of individual institutions 
are closely coordinated.”236 In an interesting contrast to the 
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sentiment in the U.S. Congress, George Osborne, the U.K. shadow 
Chancellor, said of their proposals that the financial crisis had shown 
the need to “bring together the operation of monetary policy with 
regulation of the banking system . . . . We have learned you can’t 
separate central banking from the banking system.”237 
Critics warn that a change of this magnitude would cause massive 
disruption, demoralizing the FSA’s staff and making its task very 
difficult over the coming year.238 Some commented that a danger of 
“vacuum” would be created at the heart of U.K. regulatory policy at 
a time when authorities are still grappling with a financial crisis.239 
C. Other European Proposals 
1. Overview 
Regulatory reforms at the EU level represented another step 
towards more centralized authority in the European financial 
regulatory system. On September 23, 2009, the European 
Commission proposed draft legislation to strengthen the financial 
regulation in Europe that largely adopted the principles of the de 
Larosière Report as endorsed by the European Council of Ministers 
on June 19, 2009.240 The proposed legislation would create two pan-
European agencies to improve regulation of the financial system—
the European Systemic Risk Board and the European System of 
Financial Supervisors. The European System of Financial Supervisors 
would consist of three European Supervisory Authorities—a 
European Banking Authority, a European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority, and a European Securities and 
Markets Authority. The European Supervisory Authorities would 
assume full supervisory powers for those entities that have pan-
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European reach, such as credit rating agencies and EU central 
counterparty clearing houses.  
Apart from the proposals to create pan-European regulatory 
authorities, the European Commission’s latest reform efforts have 
been directed in several areas: hedge fund regulation, the regulation 
of credit rating agencies, and OTC derivatives. The proposed 
legislation for hedge fund regulation has been very controversial and 
has met particularly strong opposition from the United Kingdom, 
home to the majority of hedge funds in Europe. Because of the 
proposed legislation’s extraterritorial impact, the U.S. government 
has also weighed in on the debate.241 In comparison, the newly 
adopted regulations on credit rating agencies and the 
Communication on OTC derivatives regulation are largely aligned 
with the regulatory developments in the United States.242 The 
discussion below will focus on the proposed pan-European 
regulatory entities and the proposed legislation on hedge fund 
regulation.  
2. The proposed pan-European regulatory entities  
The proposed European Systemic Risk Board would monitor and 
assess threats to financial stability. Its role would be largely advisory, 
and it would have no independent regulatory authority. The 
European Systemic Risk Board would be able to issue non-binding 
risk warnings and recommendations, but with no legally binding 
powers. The European Systemic Risk Board would be composed of 
the heads of the European Central Bank and the member state 
central banks, as well as the three chairs of the European System of 
 
 241. See Alistair MacDonald, U.S. Enters Europe’s Fund Debate, WALL ST. J., July 27, 
2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124864567973282125.html.  
 242. See REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL ON CREDIT 
RATING AGENCIES, available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st03/ 
st03642.en09.pdf. On July 3, 2009, the European Commission published a Communication 
on OTC derivatives regulation. Echoing the regulatory developments in the United States, the 
Communication proposes the following measures: (i) increasing use of central counterparties; 
(ii) promoting standardization of OTC derivatives; (iii) encouraging cleared derivatives to be 
traded on organized markets; and (iv) proposing the use of central data repositories for non-
cleared derivatives. See COM (2009) 332, European Commission, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/derivatives/report_en.pdf; EC 
Proposals for Increased Transparency and Risk Mitigation in Derivatives Markets, Cleary 
Gottlieb Alert Memo (July 24, 2009), available at http://www.cgsh.com/ 
files/News/e5091569-0e2f-4262-9af9-411a2d99a6be/Presentation/NewsAttachment/761 
5f030-ff35-4d3d-87a2-b7839595c7c0/CGSH%20Alert%20-%20OTC%20Derivatives.pdf.  
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Financial Supervisors. The head of European Systemic Risk Board 
would be elected by the European central banks. 
The European Supervisory Authorities would be built up from, 
and replace, the existing Committees of Supervisors, known as the 
Level 3 Committees, and be responsible for improving the quality 
and uniformity of national supervision, establishing supervisory 
colleges to strengthen oversight of cross-border institutions, and 
creating a single regulatory rulebook for the European Union. 
National supervisors would retain responsibility for day-to-day 
supervision, but, in a large concession by advocates of member 
nations’ autonomy, especially the United Kingdom, the European 
Supervisory Authorities would have binding authority to determine 
whether a national supervisor is complying with the EU rulebook 
and other EU law and issue binding decisions in the case of a 
disagreement. 
Many hope that the three European Supervisory Authorities will 
eventually lead to European level financial supervision and 
enforcement which has, until now, been politically unpalatable. The 
focus on binding decisions reflects the experience that, even with 
identical legal texts, harmonized standards, or permitted variants 
from “floors,” the EU experience with multiple interpreters and 
enforcers of the law has not resulted in effective regulation. 
However, the relationship between the proposed European 
Supervisory Authorities and national authorities remains unclear, 
perhaps deliberately so. As a result of pressure from the United 
Kingdom, EU leaders have expressly declared that “the decisions 
taken by the European Supervisory Authorities should not impinge 
in any way on the fiscal responsibilities of Member States,” and a 
European Supervisory Authority is not allowed to require a member 
state to spend its taxpayers’ money.243 
3. Hedge fund regulation 
On April 30, 2009, the European Commission issued a proposed 
Directive on Investment Alternative Fund Managers (“Directive”).244 
 
 243. Nouriel Roubini & Elisa Parisi-Capone, Regulatory Reform: A Primer, FORBES, 
June 25, 2009, available at http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/24/regulatory-reform-
obama-eu-switzerland-hedge-funds-opinions-columnists-roubini.html. 
 244. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE 
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 207 (2009), available at 
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The Directive went much further than the proposed U.S. hedge 
fund regulation, most controversially by imposing leverage limits and 
extraterritorial standards. Since the majority of Europeans’ hedge 
funds are currently managed by U.K. managers, the ongoing fight is 
mostly between Continental Europe, led by France and Germany on 
one side, and the United Kingdom on the other.245 The proposed 
Directive is, however, not expected to be adopted until at least late 
2010, owing to the complex legislative process in the European 
Union. 
The United States also has a large stake in this debate, since the 
extraterritorial standards imposed by the Directive could block U.S. 
business in Europe. The Directive would (i) prohibit the marketing 
of any funds domiciled outside the European Union unless a fund’s 
home country has certain tax agreements with the EU manager’s 
home country and (ii) impose an equivalency test between the 
provisions of the Directive and the legislation of a relevant non-EU 
country if a non-EU-based manager is to market any funds in the 
European Union. 
D. G-20 Proposals 
Financial markets are global in nature. Unless common 
regulatory standards are applied and enforced across national 
borders, opportunities for regulatory arbitrage will arise. The current 
financial crisis adds urgency to the need to seek a global approach to 
financial regulatory reform. Since the financial crisis intensified in the 
fall of 2008, three G-20 summits have been held to address the 
crisis, and financial regulatory reform was top on the agenda. The 
leaders at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh affirmed that going 
forward, the G-20 will be the premier forum for international 
economic cooperation.246 
 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/alternative_investments/fund_manag
ers_proposal_en.pdf.  
 245. Alistair MacDonald, U.S. Enters Europe’s Fund Debate, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2009, 
at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124864567973282125.html.  
 246. G-20, LEADERS’ STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf 
[hereinafter G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT]. 
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Broad consensus was reached in the G-20 summits on how to 
reform the global financial system.247 To strengthen international 
coordination and cooperation, leaders at the G-20 summits agreed 
to reform the international financial institutions. In particular, the 
reconstituted Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) will be jointly responsible for global financial 
stability.248 The FSB will be responsible for coordinating and 
monitoring progress in strengthening international financial 
regulation.249 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel 
Committee) will continue to be the leading forum for the 
development of international standards for prudential regulation.250 
The discussion below focuses on the FSB and IMF, the newly 
proposed Basel capital regulatory framework, and cross-border bank 
resolutions. 
1. The FSB and IMF 
The G-20 summits agreed that the institutional capacity of the 
FSB and IMF should be substantially strengthened. Tasked to 
promote and coordinate the development of international best 
practices and regulatory standards, the reconstituted FSB with 
enhanced capacity would have equal institutional standing alongside 
the Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF and World Bank.251 The 
resources of the IMF will be significantly increased to strengthen its 
role as lender of last resort in the international financial system. 
 
 247. See G-20, DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2009), 
available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409__1615_ 
final.pdf [hereinafter G-20, LONDON DECLARATION]. See generally FIN. STABILITY BD., 
IMPROVING FINANCIAL REGULATION, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD TO G-
20 LEADERS (2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ 
r_090925b.pdf [hereinafter FSB, IMPROVING]; FIN. STABILITY BD., OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS 
IN IMPLEMENTING THE LONDON SUMMIT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING 
FINANCIAL STABILITY, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD TO G-20 LEADERS 
(2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925a.pdf 
[hereinafter FSB, OVERVIEW].  
 248. See G-20, LONDON DECLARATION, supra note 247.  
 249. See G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246; G-20, LONDON DECLARATION, 
supra note 247. 
 250. See G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246.  
 251. See G-20, THE GLOBAL PLAN FOR RECOVERY AND REFORM (2009), available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf [hereinafter G-20, LONDON 
COMMUNIQUE]. 
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Since the G-20 summit in London, the FSB has expanded its 
membership, now including all G-20 countries, and held its 
inaugural meeting in June 2009.252 The new institutional structures 
of the FSB now include a Steering Committee and three Standing 
Committees. In particular, the Standing Committee for Supervisory 
and Regulatory Cooperation, now chaired by Lord Turner, will 
address coordination issues that arise among supervisors and 
regulators and will monitor and advise on best practice in meeting 
regulatory standards with a view to ensure consistency, cooperation, 
and a level-playing field across jurisdictions. 
The IMF has tripled its lendable resources to $750 billion 
through various means,253 including bilateral pledges and, for the 
first time, issuance of its own notes.254 The IMF also approved an 
allocation of $283 billion Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to boost 
world liquidity.255 To ensure the IMF’s long-term relevance and 
legitimacy, leaders at the G-20 summits emphasized that the IMF’s 
governance structure should be reformed and modernized to reflect 
changes in the world economy and give greater voice and 
representation to developing countries.256 
To promote financial stability at the global level, the G-20 
summits committed to the following257: the IMF and FSB, in 
collaboration, to conduct Early Warning Exercises and identify the 
build-up of macro-economical and financial risks and recommend 
actions needed to address them; the IMF and FSB to produce 
guidelines for national authorities to assess whether a financial 
institution, market or an instrument is systemically important; the 
IMF and FSB, in collaboration with the World Bank and Basel 
Committee, to develop an international framework for cross-border 
bank resolution mechanism; the FSB, in collaboration with Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS) and other international standard 
 
 252. Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Fin. Stability Bd. Holds Inaugural Meeting in Basel 
(June 27, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_090627.pdf.  
 253. IMF, BOLSTERING THE IMF’S LENDING CAPACITY (2009), available at http:// 
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/contribution.htm. 
 254. Press Release, IMF, IMF Signs US$50 Billion Note Purchase Agreement with China 
(Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09293.htm.  
 255. IMF, LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES TO BENEFIT FROM IMF ALLOCATION OF SDRS 
(2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/cs/news/2009/CSO83.htm.  
 256. G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246, at 10–11; see G-20, LONDON 
COMMUNIQUE, supra note 251. 
 257. See G-20, LONDON DECLARATION, supra note 247. 
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setters, to develop macro-prudential regulatory tools; and the FSB to 
set guidelines for, and support the establishment, functioning of, and 
participation in, supervisory colleges, including through ongoing 
identification of the most systemically important cross-border firms. 
2. Basel Committee and capital requirements 
The G-20 agreed that the Basel Committee, in collaboration 
with other international bodies and national authorities, should 
strengthen the Basel II Capital Framework for prudential regulation. 
Since the G-20 summit in London, the Basel Committee, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have all 
moved forward with various proposals on the capital, liquidity, and 
leverage requirements.258 Although all of these proposals converge 
on the basic principles, specific quantitative proposals are still being 
worked out. The G-20 summit in Pittsburgh called for reaching an 
international agreement on the new capital framework by December 
31, 2010, with the aim of implementation by December 31, 2012.259  
 a. Capital. The minimum capital requirement and the capital 
buffer above it would be higher than the pre-crisis levels. In 
particular, common equity, especially voting common equity as 
proposed by the U.S. Treasury, would be required to constitute a 
large majority of Tier 1 capital. Systemically important firms would 
be subject to even tougher capital requirements, such as a capital 
surcharge as proposed by the Basel Committee. 
The new capital framework would impose higher risk-based 
capital charges to various exposures, such as off-balance sheet 
vehicles, trading book activities and credit securitizations, particularly 
re-securitizations such as CDOs.260 The U.S. proposal would also 
 
 258. See generally U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, PRINCIPLES FOR REFORMING THE U.S. AND 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CAPITAL FRAMEWORK FOR BANKING FIRMS (2009), available 
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/capital-statement_090309.pdf; Press Release, 
Bank for Int’l. Settlements, Comprehensive Response to the Global Banking Crisis (Sept. 7, 
2009), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p090907.htm [hereinafter BIS, 
Comprehensive Response]; G-20, PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIONS OF THE LONDON AND 
WASHINGTON G-20 SUMMITS (2009), available at http://www.G20.org/Documents/ 
20090905_G20_progress_update_London_Fin_Mins_final.pdf. For more information, please 
see Annex C. 
 259. G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246.  
 260. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, REVISIONS TO THE BASEL II MARKET 
RISK FRAMEWORK (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.htm; BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTING CAPITAL FOR INCREMENTAL 
RISK IN THE TRADING BOOK (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.pdf; 
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cover equity investments and counterparty credit risk exposures to 
financial firms (e.g., non-centrally cleared derivatives, repos, reverse 
repos, securities lending and borrowing transactions, margin loans, 
etc.). 
To mitigate the pro-cyclicality effects of the current capital 
framework, a so-called counter-cyclical capital buffer framework 
would be developed to reflect more forward-looking, through-the-
cycle considerations, resulting in higher capital requirements in the 
early phases of the credit cycle, and more uniform capital 
requirements throughout the cycle. The counter-cyclical capital 
buffer framework as proposed by the Basel Committee would also 
include capital conservation measures to constrain capital 
distributions, e.g., dividend payments, share buybacks, and 
compensation.261 Separately, a framework of more forward-looking 
loan loss reserves is being developed by international and national 
regulatory bodies in collaboration with the accounting standard 
setters. In August 2008, the European Commission published a 
consultative paper on through-the-cycle expected loss provisioning 
based on the Spanish dynamic provisioning model.262 
 b. Liquidity.263 The Basel Committee, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the European Union have all actively moved 
ahead to institute quantitative and qualitative frameworks for better 
liquidity risk management. The focus has been on several elements, 
including: (i) adequate levels of highly liquid marketable securities 
free of impediments that can be used to meet liquidity needs in 
stressful situations; (ii) increased focus on firms’ stress testing and 
contingency funding plans that sufficiently address potential adverse 
liquidity events and emergency cash flow requirements; and (iii) 
comprehensive internal liquidity measurement and monitoring 
systems. In particular, the Basel Committee will introduce a 
 
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, ENHANCEMENTS TO THE BASEL II FRAMEWORK 
(2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf; Accompanying Document to a 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Capital 
Requirements Directive on Trading Book, Securitization Issues and Remuneration Policies, 
COM (2009) 362 final (July 13, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/summary_en.pdf. 
 261. BIS, Comprehensive Response, supra note 258. 
 262. European Commission, Commission Services Staff Working Document: Possible 
Further Changes to the Capital Requirements Directive (2009), available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2009/capital_requirements_directive/ 
CRD_consultation_document_en.pdf.  
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minimum global standard for funding liquidity that includes a 
liquidity coverage ratio requirement, underpinned by a longer-term 
structural liquidity ratio to address liquidity mismatches.264 
 c. Leverage. The new capital framework would impose a non-risk-
based leverage ratio. The Basel Committee is expected to release a 
proposal by the end of 2009 with calibration and impact assessment 
to be completed by mid-2010.265 To ensure comparability, the G-20 
at their summit in Pittsburgh agreed that the details of the leverage 
ratio will be harmonized internationally to adjust for accounting 
differences.266 
3. Cross-border bank resolution  
There is a growing consensus that the international financial 
system needs a better mechanism for resolving systemically important 
financial institutions. Many believe that the failure of Lehman 
Brothers exposed a process that does not meet appropriate standards 
for the orderly winding up of systemically important financial 
institutions. The G-20 concluded that the world needs to develop 
internationally-coordinated tools and frameworks for the effective 
resolution of large, financial groups to help mitigate the disruption 
of their failures to the financial system and reduce moral hazard in 
the future. Leaders at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh specifically 
committed to address issues on cross-border resolution and crisis 
management by the end of 2010.267 
 
 263. For more information on the U.S. proposed interagency guideline on liquidity 
management, see Proposed Interagency Guidance—Funding and Liquidity Risk Management, 
74 Fed. Reg. 32,035 (July 6, 2009), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/ 
2009/pdf/E9-15800.pdf. For more information on the FSA liquidity managements, see FSA, 
CP08/22: STRENGTHENING LIQUIDITY STANDARDS (2009), available at http://www.fsa. 
gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp08_22.pdf; FSA, CP09/14: STRENGTHENING LIQUIDITY STANDARDS 3: 
LIQUIDITY TRANSITIONAL MEASURES (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/ 
pubs/cp/cp09_14.pdf; and FSA, CP09/13: STRENGTHENING LIQUIDITY STANDARDS 2: 
LIQUIDITY REPORTING (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_13.pdf. 
For more information on the EU proposal for liquidity management, see COMMITTEE OF 
EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS, CONSULTATION PAPER ON LIQUIDITY BUFFERS & 
SURVIVAL PERIODS (2009), available at http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/8ed674fc-d767-
4eed-b0c2-ac6f65b92d04/CP28-on-Liquidity-Buffers.aspx.  
 264. FSB, IMPROVING, supra note 247, at 5; BIS, Comprehensive Response, supra note 
258. 
 265. See BIS, Comprehensive Response, supra note 258. 
 266. G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246, at 8.  
 267. Id. at 9. 
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 a. Contingency planning.268 The G-20 at their summit in 
Pittsburgh emphasized the development of internationally-consistent 
firm-specific contingency and resolution plans, or “living wills.”269 
All major cross-border firms with an FSB supervisory college would 
be required to develop such plans, considering both “going-
concern,” or “gone concern” scenarios. The plans to be prepared by 
the firms would cover how to exit risky positions and scale back 
activities in an orderly fashion, and an effective, rapid, and cost-
effective wind-down, if necessary. The FSB, under its Cross-Border 
Crisis Management Working Group, has already scheduled such 
contingency planning discussions with the major firms, that will take 
place later this year and in the first half of 2010. 
 b. Cross-border bank resolution and national bank insolvency 
regimes. The G-20 summit at Pittsburgh specifically endorsed two 
major international initiatives to develop cross-border bank 
resolution frameworks.270 One initiative is the Cross-Border Bank 
Resolution Group at the Basel Committee (CBRG). The CBRG 
recently issued a consultative paper that proposes actions to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of cross-border crisis management and 
bank resolutions.271 The other initiative is the IMF/World Bank 
Global Bank Insolvency Initiative. The IMF and World Bank issued 
an interim report in April 2009 and will issue a final report in the 
spring of 2010.272 
With more European countries moving to institute special bank 
resolution regimes, it makes more sense to harmonize differences, 
and ensure consistency, among the regimes across countries. The 
European Commission plans to release a consultative paper that 
examines the issue of harmonizing rules of its member states for 
unwinding troubled banks and will probably propose a Directive 
 
 268. FSB, OVERVIEW, supra note 247.  
 269. G-20, PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 246, at 9. 
 270. FSB, OVERVIEW, supra note 247, at 3. An international NGO, the International 
Insolvency Institute, established a working group dedicated to promoting the development of 
special insolvency regimes at international forums, such as the G-20. See http://www.iiiglobal. 
org/about.  
 271. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLMENT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/bcbs162.pdf?noframes=1.  
 272. See IMF & WORLD BANK, AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR BANK INSOLVENCY (2009), available at http://www.imf. 
org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/041709.pdf.  
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eventually.273 The final report by the IMF and World Bank will also 
include recommendations on how to achieve more consistency 
among national bank insolvency laws.274 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As noted above, the United States and other governments have 
responded to the financial crisis by proposing the broadest set of 
regulatory reforms since the 1930s. These reforms generally propose 
the creation of systemic risk regulatory bodies that would focus on 
macro-prudential (as opposed to micro-prudential) supervision and 
regulation, and include more robust laws for winding up, or 
“resolving” systemically important financial institutions in ways that 
are less disruptive to the financial system during economic panics 
than traditional insolvency codes. They also generally call for greater 
and more counter-cyclical capital, liquidity, and maximum leverage 
requirements; regulation of executive compensation to reduce moral 
hazard by requiring management to internalize the risks of their 
choices; and increased regulation of over-the-counter derivatives. 
The conventional wisdom is that by flooding the markets with 
liquidity in response to this crisis, central banks and other 
governmental bodies have avoided the mistakes of the 1930s. Time 
will only tell whether these actions have truly been wise, or whether 
they have merely planted the seeds for a more severe and 
uncontrollable future economic calamity of the sort described in 
ancient apocalyptic literature.275 There are two serious dangers in the 
near term. If governments do not pull back the extraordinary 
assistance to the markets soon enough, we could experience runaway 
inflation that will be difficult to control. On the other hand, if 
governments pull back too quickly, we could see another collapse in 
asset prices and a double-dip recession. Because of political pressures 
that favor safety over sacrifice, I believe the former risk is more likely. 
 
 273. Matthew Dalton, Europeans Review Bank Rules, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at A10, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124757731423738667.html.  
 274. FSB, OVERVIEW, supra note 247. 
 275. For example, Chapter 18 of the Book of Revelation (or Apocalypse) predicts the 
collapse in one day of a metaphorical City of Babylon, leaving the economic system in 
shambles and the merchants of the world weeping and mourning over its collapse. Revelation 
18: 2, 11–16. 
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ANNEX A 
FINANCIAL CRISIS LEGAL TIMELINE 
 
 
V V
August 1, 2009
February 1
January 1, 2009
December 1
November 1
March 1
April 1
May 1
June 1
July 1
FRB announces TSLF
Treasury announces automotive industry financing program
FRB approves GMAC as a BHC
Bush requests remaining $350 bn on behalf of Obama administration
Treasury, FRB and FDIC announce additional support to B of A
Geithner announces Financial Stability Plan
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act becomes law
Stress tests program announced
Treasury announces conversion of Citi investment in part to common stock
Treasury announces auto supplies support program
Treasury and FDIC announce PPIP
FRB announces stress test results
TALF expanded to include legacy CMBS
GM files for Chapter 11
FDIC postpones Legacy Loans Program
10 large financial institutions approved to repay TARP
Treasury announces warrants repurchase guidelines
Treasury announces PPIP asset managers
For a detailed timeline of 
September 2008 – October 2008, see next page
03/11
11/12
11/26
11/25
11/23
11/10
Summer 2007
FRB announces PDCF, opening the discount window to investment banks 03/16
Bear Stearns rescue 03/14
Spike in early delinquencies of recent subprime mortgages
Tens of billions of MBS/CDO markdowns Fall 2007
Winter/Spring 2008
Summer 2008IndyMac fails 07/11
Housing and Economic Recovery Act becomes law 07/30
FRB and Treasury announce restructuring of government assistance to AIG
AMEX approved as a BHC
Treasury, FRB and FDIC announce additional support to Citi
FRB announces TALF
FRB announces GSE purchase facility
Treasury abandons asset purchase program
12/19
12/24
01/12
01/16
02/10
02/17
02/27
02/25
03/19
03/23
05/07
05/19
06/01
06/03
06/09
06/26
07/08
April 1 – May 1, 2009 : Congress in recess
September-October 2008
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November 1, 2008
September 1, 2008
October 1
Fannie and Freddie placed into conservatorship; $200 bn earmarked 
for capital injections
Bank of America purchases Merrill
FRB authorizes $85 bn for AIG
Lehman files for Chapter 11
SEC temporarily bans short selling of financial stocks
Treasury submits legislation for authority to purchase troubled assets
Goldman and Morgan Stanley approved as BHCs
WaMu fails; JPMorgan assumes deposit liabilities and acquires assets
House rejects Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act becomes law
FRB announces CPFF
Treasury announces CPP
FDIC announces TLGP
FRB approves Wells Fargo / Wachovia merger
FRB announces MMIFF
PNC purchases National City
Treasury purchases $125 bn in preferred stock in 9 US financial 
institutions
09/07
09/13
09/16
10/14
10/07
09/17
09/20
09/21
09/25
09/29
10/03
10/12
10/21
10/24
10/28
Dow falls 780 points09/30
FDIC raises deposit insurance to $250,000 per person per institution
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ANNEX B 
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ANNEX D 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
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